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"Access to justice is the subject for countless bar commis-
sions, committees, conferences, and colloquia, but it is not a core
concern in American policy decisions, constitutional jurispru-
dence, or law school curricula," writes Deborah L. Rhode, an
influential scholar on legal ethics and the legal profession.1
Decrying the "shameful irony that the nation with the world's
most lawyers has one of the least adequate systems for legal assis-
tance,"2 Professor Rhode urges "[c]ourts, legislatures, and bar
associations . . . [to] assume greater obligations to insure ade-
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1. Deborah L. Rhode, The Constitution of Equal Citizenship for a Good Society:
Access to Justice, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1785, 1786 (2001). Professor Rhode is the
Ernest W. McFarland Professor at Stanford Law School and Director of the
Keck Center on Legal Ethics and the Legal Profession.
2. Id. For an early important statement of this view, see REGINALD HEBER
SMITH, JUSTICE AND THE POOR (1919). Smith writes:
The administration of American justice is not impartial, the rich and
poor do not stand on an equality before the law, the traditional
method of providing justice has operated to close the doors of the
courts to the poor, and has caused a gross denial ofjustice in all parts
of the country to millions of persons.
Id. at 8.
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quate legal assistance for those who need but cannot realistically
afford it."3
The literature on access to justice generally uses the term
"legal assistance" to mean the provision of counsel, whether sub-
sidized by the government or compensated by contingency fee or
other arrangement, to a party who cannot afford representa-
tion.4 Access to justice, however, should also entail other forms
of legal assistance, including a court structure that responds
fairly and efficiently to claimants who lack the legal equipage
needed to present their cases in an effective way.5 In this Article,
we describe various institutional adaptations made by one federal
district court in response to the increasing number of claims
filed by pro se civil litigants, who are typically indigent and can-
not afford counsel.6 In May 2001, the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of New York appointed a new mag-
istrate judge and assigned her to hear and to oversee significant
categories of pro se matters. Magistrate judges are judicial
officers with powers determined by statute, but responsibilities
determined by each federal district.7 Although other federal dis-
trict courts have enlisted the assistance of magistrate judges in
the handling of pro se cases, the Eastern District of New York's
3. Rhode, supra note 2, at 1818.
4. See generally Alan W. Houseman, Civil Legal Assistance for the Twenty-First
Century: Achieving EqualJustice for All, 17 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 369 (1998) (urg-
ing the development of new approaches to the distribution of legal services for
the poor). Discussing "access to justice," Stephen L. Pepper distinguishes
between two meanings of the term: the first refers to "the distribution of lawyer
services in regard to litigation, and in the attendant negotiations of disputes
prior to litigation," and the second "focus[es] notjust on litigation and dispute
resolution, but on access to legal advice more generally." See Stephen L. Pep-
per, Access To What?, 2J. INST. STUD. LEG. ETH. 269, 269-70 (1999).
5. Equipage refers to "the legally optional, yet practically essential"
resources needed to mount an effective case, including "attorneys' fees, chiefly,
but consultant, expert witness, investigation, stenographic, and printing costs as
well." Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The Right
to Protect One's Rights, Part 1, 1973 DUKE LJ. 1153, 1163.
6. Pro se means "[flor himself; in his own behalf; in person. Appearing
for oneself, as in the case of one who does not retain a lawyer and appears for
himself in court." BLACK's LAw DICrIONARY 1099 (5th ed. 1979).
7. See R. Lawrence Dessem, The Role of the Federal Magistrate Judge in Civil
Justice Reform, 67 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 799, 804 (1993) ("Although the office of
magistrate judge is established by federal statute, the duties of specific magis-
trate judges are determined within each judicial district."); Christopher E.
Smith, Judicial Lobbying and Court Reform: U.S. Magistrate Judges and the Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990, 14 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 163, 166 n.18 (1992)
[hereinafter Smith, Judicial Lobbying] ("Because the precise role for magistrates
was left intentionally undefined by Congress, district judges can use magistrates
according to the needs of their district and their own personal preferences.").
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approach to the problem is sufficiently different to warrant
closer attention. Moreover, the literature has so far emphasized
state judicial responses to the rise in pro se cases, with less atten-
tion paid to Article III innovations to deal with the needs of
unrepresented litigants."
By appointing a special magistrate judge to handle particu-
lar pro se matters, the Eastern District of New York seeks to facili-
tate access to the courts "for those who need but cannot
realistically afford Uudicial relief]."' However, some may see the
assignment as a way to funnel unimportant matters that society
regards as annoying away from Article III judges to magistrate
judges without life tenure, and so raise concerns about second
class justice for unrepresented litigants."l Others may view the
designating of a special decisionmaker to assist pro se claimants
as presenting ethical concerns about judicial impartiality and
independence. A full appraisal of the Eastern District of New
York's approach to pro se cases is needed if it is to stand as a
model for other courts to "provide meaningful access to legal
institutions for the most disadvantaged- . . . one of the most
important and intractable issues that face judges, policymakers,
and concerned lawyers of this generation."1
8. The leading report on state judicial responses to pro se litigation is that
ofJoNA GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF PRO SE LITIGATION: A
REPORT AND GUIDEBOOK FOR JUDGES AND COURT MANAGERS (1998), which
reports the results of a nationwide survey of state court practices conducted by
the American Judicature Society and the State Justice Institute. For a helpful
collection of materials describing recent Article III innovations in different dis-
trict courts to process pro se cases, see Special Issue on Pro Se Litigation: New Legis-
lation, New Challenges, 9 FJC DIRECTIONS (1996) [hereinafter Special Issue on Pro
Se Litigation].
9. Rhode, supra note 2, at 1818.
10. See Peter G. McCabe, The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, 16 HARV.J. ON
LEGis. 343, 384 (1979) (acknowledging critics' concern that expanded magis-
trate jurisdiction would create a "dual system of justice" and "the spectre of a
federal poor people's court"); cf. Jack B. Weinstein, The Poor's Right to Equal
Access to the Courts, 13 CONN. L. REv. 651, 657 (1981) (referring to "cynical
attempts to isolate and pick off smaller plaintiffs ... or to create a two-tiered
system ofjustice that would effectively consign the poor to a second-rate forum
for adjudicating their just grievances"). On whether federal courts disfavor pro
se claims, see CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, COURTS AND THE POOR 39 (1991) [herein-
after SMITH, COURTS AND THE POOR] ("Because the judicial officers may have a
personal interest in quickly terminating these routine and repetitive cases filed
by unsympathetic claimants, there is a risk that prisoners' cases, especially those
filed by poor prisoners not represented by attorneys, will be dismissed without
receiving adequate consideration.").
11. William Wayne Justice, The Origins of Ruiz v. Estelle, 43 STAN. L. REv. 1,
1 (1990); see also Weinstein, supra note 11, at 655 ("Equal access to the judicial
process is the sine qua non of a just society.").
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In Part I, we explore what one commentator calls "the flood
of unrepresented litigants"12 in courts nationwide and the vari-
ous approaches that federal courts have taken to deal with the
pressures that pro se cases generate. In Part II, we focus on the
Eastern District of New York and its decision to designate a spe-
cial magistrate judge to oversee pro se matters. In Part III, we
examine the advantages and disadvantages of the single magis-
trate judge approach for the processing and disposition of pro se
matters, recognizing that the work of this office is still at an early
stage of institutional development and that additional lessons will
be learned with experience and practice."3
1.
Writing in 1966, Ben. C. Duniway, ajudge on the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, observed, "The poor plaintiff
who has a meritorious money or property claim can nearly always
find a lawyer who will take his case because of the almost univer-
sal use of the contingent fee to finance the litigation and even
the litigant." 4 Duniway could not have anticipated the growth
over the next forty years in federal litigation by poor litigants
unrepresented by counsel, or the pressures that these cases cre-
ate in the Article III system. 5 In this Part, we describe the vol-
ume and nature of pro se cases in the federal courts nationwide.
Next, we set out the constitutional and statutory framework for
the Article III response to case filings by indigent unrepresented
litigants. Finally, we briefly describe the ways in which some dis-
trict courts have adapted their institutional structures to handle
the surge in pro se civil filings.
12. Russell Engler, And justice for All-Including the Unrepresented Poor: Revi-
siting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1987, 1991
(1999).
13. See MAGISTRATE JUDGES COMMITTEE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, SUG-
GESTIONS FOR UTILIZATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGES 1, 1 (Dec. 1999) [hereinafter
SUGGESTIONS FOR UTILIZATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGES] (stating that lessons can
be learned about the advantages and disadvantages of magistrate judges from
the "courts' experiences with this resource"). We do not discuss the Article III
implications of the single magistrate judge approach.
14. Ben. C. Duniway, The Poor Man in the Federal Courts, 18 STAN. L. REv.
1270, 1285 (1966) (emphasis omitted).
15. See Rya W. Zobel, New Statutes Add to Challenges Posed by Pro Se Cases in
the Federal Courts, 9 FJC DIRECTIONS 1, 1 (1996) ("Discussions regarding pro se
litigation generally emphasize the burdens placed on judges and support staff
by unrepresented litigants who are unfamiliar with rules and procedures for
pursuing civil actions in the federal courts.").
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A. The Federal Docket: Litigation Explosion or Unmet Need?
A consistent theme in the literature on federal courts is that
the Article III system has witnessed a "huge expansion of federal
litigation."' 6 Writing in 1990, the Federal Courts Study Commit-
tee characterized the situation of the federal docket as a "crisis,"
in terms of its "congestion, delay, expense, and expansion."17
The Committee explained, "[W]e must point out that between
1958 and 1988, following decades of extremely slow caseload
growth, the number of cases (both civil and criminal) filed in the
federal district courts (i.e., trial courts), trebled, while the num-
ber filed in the courts of appeals increased more than tenfold.""8
A significant percentage of these increased filings involve
pro se litigants, and a majority of the pro se filings are by prison-
ers asserting civil rights or constitutional claims.' 9 Nationwide,
prisoner petitioners comprised only one percent of federal civil
filings in 1958; by 1989, these petitions constituted eleven per-
cent of all civil filings.2 ° The number of habeas corpus peti-
16. Jack B. Weinstein & Jonathan B. Wiener, Of Sailing Ships and Seeking
Facts: Brief Reflections on Magistrates and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 62 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 429, 430 (1988).
17. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 3 (1990). Some
commentators question whether a crisis exists in the federal courts, and if it
does, its cause and content. See, e.g., Marc S. Galanter, The Day After the Litigation
Explosion, 46 MD. L. REv. 3, 15 (1986) (characterizing federal court docket
explosion as a myth); Weinstein, supra note 11, at 657 (Senior Judge of the
Eastern District of New York stating, "I believe that the courts are not overu-
tilized, but underutilized, precisely because they are not adequate fora for the
grievances of the poor and oppressed").
18. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 18, at
5.
19. See David Rauma & Charles P. Sutelan, Analysis of Pro Se Case Filings in
Ten U.S. District Courts Yields New Information, 9 FJC DIRECTIONS 6, 6 (1996)
(reporting that twenty-one percent of all case filings in ten districts in the
period 1991 to 1994 involved pro se litigants, and that prisoner petitions consti-
tuted sixty-three percent of these filings); Kim Mueller, Inmates' Civil Rights
Cases and the Federal Courts: Insights Derived from a Field Research Project in the East-
ern District of California, 28 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1255, 1330 n.8 (1995) ("Starting
in 1982, reports issued by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts
noted that prisoner civil rights petitions comprised a significant and growing
segment of federal litigation."); see also REPORT OF THE CVIL JUSTICE REFORM
ACT ADVISORY GROUP OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN
DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 34-35 (John B. Oakley, Reporter, Nov. 21, 1991) [here-
inafter CIVILJUSTICE REFORM REPORT] (reporting that in the Eastern District of
California, "prisoner cases went from 11.6 percent of the total civil docket in
1981 to 36 percent of the total civil filings in 1990 ... from 1988-1990... for all
civil cases, prisoner cases represented approximately 34 percent of the total
filings").
20. See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 18,
at 49 (citing civil filing statistics). In addition, the number of habeas corpus
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tions-the federal mechanism by which prisoners challenge their
custody by the government21-rose 1800% nationwide from
1945 to 1989.22 Similarly, the federal courts have witnessed a
surge in § 1983 cases2" filed by inmates challenging the condi-
tions of their confinement, including the denial of medical care,
physical abuse, and improper placement in administrative segre-
gation.24 In 1966 (the first year statistics were maintained for
inmate § 1983 filings as a separate category),25 inmates filed 218
such actions; in 1992, inmates filed 26,824 such actions, consti-
tuting more than ten percent of the federal court's total number
of civil filings. The majority of prisoners proceed pro se in these
actions-ninety-six percent according to a recent survey.26
The increase in pro se prisoner petitions puts a greater
strain on the court system than would a similar expansion in civil
filings by plaintiffs represented by counsel. As the Federal Judi-
cial Center acknowledged twenty years ago, "The fact that the
cases are pro se complicates the task of the judge, the magistrate,
the clerk, and other court personnel and makes it more difficult
petitions showed "a steep 'spike"' in 1996 and 1997, coinciding with the enact-
ment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. See Fred Cheese-
man, II, Roger A. Hanson & Brian Ostrom, To Augur Well: Future Prison
Population and Prisoner Litigation (unpublished manuscript prepared for presen-
tation at the Federal Judicial Center, Washington, D.C., 11 (May 20, 1998) (on
file with Lois Bloom, United States District Court, Eastern District of New York).
21. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
22. See REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 18,
at 51 (reporting 537 habeas corpus petitions filed in 1945 and 10,521 in 1989).
23. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action
brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such
officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
24. See ROGER A. HANSON & HENRY W.K. DALEY, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CHAL-
LENGING THE CONDITIONS OF PRISONS AND JAILS: A REPORT ON SECTION 1983 LITI-
GATION 17 tbl. 3 (1995) (listing issues in inmate § 1983 lawsuits).
25. See Marie Cordisco, District of Nevada Uses Early Hearings to Cope with
State Prisoner Pro Se Civil Rights Caseload, 9 FJC DIRECTIONS 18, 18 (1996)
(describing 1966 as "the first year state prisoners' rights cases were listed as a
category" in reports maintained by the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts).
26. HANSON & DALEY, supra note 25, at 2 (citing case filing statistics); Id.
at 21 (citing pro se statistics for inmate § 1983 actions).
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for them to effectively and efficiently identify the meritorious
conditions-of-confinement case."27
The federal courts have also witnessed an increase in two
other categories of non-prisoner pro se litigation: Social Security
appeals and non-prisoner civil rights cases. Social Security
appeals involve challenges by individuals, often indigent, to deci-
sions by administrative law judges that deny or terminate disabil-
ity benefits under federal law. 28 Non-prisoner civil rights cases
have likewise increased over the last decade. After remaining sta-
ble from 1985 to 1990, the number of civil rights filings rose
eighty-six percent from 1991 to 1995.29 A majority of these cases
involves claims of employment discrimination, and commenta-
tors attribute the increase in filings to the passage of new legisla-
tion, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act, as well as to
fluctuations in the employment market based on economic
downturns. 30
The rise in pro se cases in the Article III system is consistent
with a parallel rise of filings by unrepresented litigants in state
judicial systems across the country.3' Indeed, studies indicate
that at least eighty percent of the legal needs of the poor go
unmet, with the largest numbers of pro se litigants found in state
specialist courts, involving such matters as family relations and
small commercial disputes. 32 Although an important, earlier
27. See PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS COMMITTEE, FED. JUD. CTR., RECOMMENDED
PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING PRISONER CIVIL RIGHTS CASES IN THE FEDERAL
COURTS 3 (1980) [hereinafter ALDISERT REPORT].
28. See generally HELEN HERSHKOFF & STEPHEN LOFFREDO, THE RIGHTS OF
THE POOR 90-98 (1997) (describing the Social Security system as it relates to
appeals in Supplemental Security Income cases); Jon C. Dubin, Social Security
Law, 26 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 763 (1995) (describing cash benefit programs for
persons with disabilities).
29. See Ellyn L. Vail, Caseload Trends: Civil Rights Filings Increase, FEDERAL
COURT MANAGEMENT REPORT 3 (Aug.-Sept. 1996).
30. See generally Kathryn Moss et al., Unfunded Mandate: An Empirical Study
of the Americans with Disabilities Act by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
50 U. KAN. L. REv. 1 (2001).
31. Zobel, supra note 16, at 1 (referring to rises in pro se filings in state
judicial systems).
32. See Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out of Line: The Need for Regulation of
Lawyers' Negotiations with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85 CAL. L. REv. 79, 79-80
(1997) ("Many litigants appear without counsel, a result not surprising given
reports that over eighty percent of the legal needs of the poor and working
poor currently are unmet."); Rhode, supra note 2, at 1785 ("[A]n estimated
four-fifths of the civil legal needs of the poor, and the needs of an estimated
two-to-three-fifths of middle-income individuals, remain unmet."). See also
REPORT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION TASK FORCE FOR LEGAL SERVICES
TO THE NEEDY 7 (1990) (reporting that a telephone survey of 625 low-income
households indicated that sixty-seven percent of the households surveyed had
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study of lawyer access questioned whether disposable income cor-
relates with lawyer use," today the literature emphasizes expense
as a barrier to meaningful judicial access, not only for poor and
low-income, but also for middle-class households.8 4 Congres-
sional policies seeking to limit or inhibit civil filings by indigent
litigants further exacerbate these difficulties. Congress has
refused to provide adequate funding to the Legal Services Corpo-
ration, thereby reducing the availability of government-funded
lawyers for civil litigants.35 It has also restricted the kinds of legal
services that government-funded lawyers can provide to their cli-
ents, for example, by prohibiting class action litigation, despite
the fact that such constraints may result in inefficiency for the
judicial system overall.36 In addition, Congress has barred legal
services lawyers from representing inmates who seek to press
civil, including constitutional, claims before the court.3 7
A litigant's lack of counsel creates particular pressures in a
legal system that depends on the parties to initiate and defend
civil matters. Even in the simple case-"' ordinary,' 'routine,'
'run of the mine,' 'garden variety' (pick your metaphor)" says
"at least one civil legal problem within the past three years, [and] only 6% con-
sulted a lawyer about the problem(s)").
33. See Project, An Assessment of Alternative Strategies for Increasing Access to
Legal Services, 90 YALE L.J. 122, 155 (1980) (discussing the view that "experience,
property ownership and personal contacts with lawyers" and not disposable
income determine an individual's use of lawyer services).
34. See Justice Web Collaboratory, Meeting the Needs of Self-Represented Liti-
gants: A Consumer Based Approach, at http://www.judgelink.org/PublicAccess/
proposal.html ("Perhaps the most fundamental criticism Americans make of
the civil courts is that they are not affordable . . . . The most visible conse-
quence of unaffordability is the growth in the number of self-represented liti-
gants in state courts ...."). The problem of litigation expense and adequate
legal representation extends beyond the U.S. legal system; as one commentator
puts it, "Equal access to the courts is a worldwide problem. Indigent, disabled
or foreign persons everywhere have difficulties in obtaining legal advice and
representation." Heribert A. Hirte, Access to the Courts for Indigent Persons: A Com-
parative Analysis of the Legal Framework in the United Kingdom, United States and
Germany, 40 INT'L & COmP. L.Q. 91, 91 (1991).
35. See generally Robert W. Sweet, Civil "Gideon" and Justice in the Trial Court
(the Rabbi's Beard), 52 THE REC. OF THE AsS'N OF THE B. OF THE Crrv OF N.Y. 915
(1997) (discussing congressional curtailment of funds for legal services).
36. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996(a)-2996(l) (Supp. 2001). See generally Lawrence
E. Norton II, Not Too Much Justice for the Poor, 101 DICK. L. REV. 601, 607 (1997)
(discussing federal restrictions on class action litigation by legal services
lawyers).
37. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2996(a)-2996(l) (Supp. 2001). See generally Norton,
supra note 37, at 608 ("Congress . .. simply took away inmates' lawyers by
prohibiting any legal services organization that receives Legal Services Corpora-
tion (LSC) funds from representing any inmate in any matter whatsoever.").
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Judith Resnik S-the inability to secure legal advice may prevent
a meritorious claim from ever being presented to a judge. 9
Moreover, the legally untrained face special difficulties in navi-
gating and carrying out the arcane requirements of pleading and
instead "often submit awkward and confusing complaints."4 ° Pro
se claims can implicate abstruse and complex statutes, yet pro se
litigants lack the resources, financial and other, to interpret the
governing law or to marshal evidentiary and expert support for
their claims.4 ' Lack of meaningful access to judicial enforce-
ment mechanisms can thus effectively deprive the poor of legal
protection in important areas of their lives.
Pro se cases present unique challenges to the federal courts
given the complexity of the issues and the importance of the con-
stitutional values. Petitions for writs of habeas corpus dominate
the federal district court's pro se caseload.42 Although a habeas
38. Judith Resnik, Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the
Meaning of Article III, 113 HARv. L. REv. 924, 969 (2000).
39. See Marc S. Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know
and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious
Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4, 14 (1983) ("The perception of grievances requires
cognitive resources.").
40. Stephen M. Feldman, Indigents in the Federal Courts: The In Forma
Pauperis Statute-Equality and Frivolity, 54 FORDHAM L. REv. 413, 419 (1985). See
also SMITH, COURTS AND THE POOR, supra note 11, at 39 (stating that "pro se
litigants face a significant challenge in attempting to phrase their complaints in
accordance with proper legal terminology and required court procedures").
41. Social Security claims, for example, often turn on the quality of the
medical data submitted in support of the plaintiffs disability; as one commenta-
tor puts it, "Given the problems that attend the compilation of the medical data
that form the heart of a disability case, the assistance that a claimant receives in
presenting his case can be crucial to its outcome." Jon C. Dubin, Poverty, Pain,
and Precedent: The Fiflh Circuit's Social Security Jurisprudence, 25 ST. MARY'S LJ. 81,
92 (1993) (quotingJack B. Weinstein, Equality and the Law: Social Security Disabil-
ity Cases in the Federal Courts, 35 SYRACUSE L. REv. 897, 933 (1984)); cf Weisbrod
v. Sullivan, 875 F.2d 526, 528 (5th Cir. 1989) ("The Social Security Act is the
most intricate ever drafted by Congress. Its Byzantine construction, as Judge
Friendly has observed, makes the Act 'almost unintelligible to the uniniti-
ated.'") (quoting Freidman v. Berger, 547 F.2d 724, 727 n.7 (2d Cir. 1976)).
42. See Morales v. Portuondo, 154 F. Supp. 2d 706, 734 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
As the district court explained:
The writ of habeas corpus is often requested and rarely granted. Last
year, 24,945 habeas petitions were filed in the federal district courts
throughout the country, and habeas petitions constitute the single
largest category of civil cases filed in the federal courts. The vast
majority were without merit. It is easy to become disillusioned, for
"prisoner actions occupy a disproportionate amount of the time and
energy of the federal judiciary."
Id. (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 584 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring)
(internal citation omitted)).
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corpus action is civil in nature, the petition resembles a criminal
proceeding in that it challenges the litigant's custody by the gov-
ernment and directly implicates his or her liberty.43 A habeas
petition alleges that a prisoner is confined in violation of his or
her constitutional rights. Common claims include violations of
the right to a fair and speedy trial or the right to effective assis-
tance of counsel.44 In an area in which intricate questions of
constitutional law, civil procedure, and criminal procedure often
converge, most inmates nevertheless proceed pro se, and the
stakes run high.45 Under current law, an inmate has only one
year from the date his or her conviction is made final to seek
review,4 6 and is generally permitted to file only one petition per
conviction.47 Federal courts reject a majority of the petitions.
But, as the Federal Courts Study Committee put it, habeas corpus
proceedings are "of central concern to the nation and to its fed-
eral courts."4 8 Other categories of pro se filings likewise involve
important federal interests and individual protections. Civil
rights cases, for example, reflect broad congressional goals in
favor of equal and fair workplace conditions.49
B. The Constitutional and Statutory Framework
The Constitution and federal statutes, as they relate to an
individual's right to judicial access and to legal representation,
frame the federal court's response to pro se litigation. Whether
rooted in the Privileges and Immunity Clause,5" the First Amend-
43. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (1994) ("The writ of habeas corpus shall not
extend to a prisoner unless he is in custody.").
44. See ROGER A. HANSON & HENRY W. K. DALEY, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FED-
ERAL HABEAS CORPUS REVIEW: CHALLENGING STATE COURT CRIMINAL CONVIC-
TIONS 14 (1995) ("In 93% of the sampled habeas corpus cases, the prisoner was
without legal counsel (pro se).").
45. Id. at iv.
46. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-132, § 1, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of
18 U.S.C.).
47. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b) (3) (A) (Supp. 2001) ("Before a second or suc-
cessive application permitted by this section is filed in the district court, the
applicant shall move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authoriz-
ing the district court to consider the application.").
48. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 18, at
51.
49. See generally Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115
HARv. L. REV. 642 (2001).
50. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled
to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."); Corfield v.
Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (stating that "the privileges
2002] FEDERAL COURTS, MAGISTRATE JUDGES, AND THE PRO SE PLAINTIFF 485
51 52ment, or due process, the Supreme Court has consistently
recognized that the right to judicial access is a fundamental right
preservative of other rights in our democratic system. 55  As an
ideal, an individual enjoys this right whatever the nature of his or
her claim and even if incarcerated.5 4 "One of the basic princi-
ples, one of the glories, of the American system of justice is that
the courthouse door is open to everyone-the humblest citizen,
the indigent, the convicted felon, the illegal alien." 5
Civil litigants, including prisoners, have a right to appear in
court unrepresented by counsel.56 But the Constitution, as cur-
rently interpreted, does not mandate the provision of counsel to
all civil litigants should they desire representation.57 Instead, the
and immunities of citizens in the several states . . . [include the right] to insti-
tute and maintain actions of any kind in the courts of the state").
51. U.S CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."). See
generally Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of Access to Court Under the Petition Clause of
the First Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 557 (1999) (exploring
the contours of a First Amendment right to judicial access).
52. U.S. CONsT. amend. V ("No person shall be . .. deprived of life, lib-
erty, or property, without due process of law"); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1
("[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law"); see Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971) (stat-
ing that "due process requires, at a minimum, that absent a countervailing state
interest of overriding significance, persons forced to settle their claims of right
and duty through the judicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity
to be heard"). But see id. at 382 ("We do not decide that access for all individu-
als to the courts is a right that is, in all circumstances, guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. .. ").
53. See Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co., 207 U.S. 142, 154 (1907)
(Harlan, J., dissenting) ("The right to sue and defend in the courts ... is the
right conservative of all other rights.").
54. See, e.g., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984) ("Like others,
prisoners have the constitutional right to petition the Government for redress
of their grievances, which includes a reasonable right of access to the courts.").
55. NAACP v. Meese, 615 F. Supp. 200, 205-06 (D.D.C. 1985).
56. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1994) ("In all courts of the United States the
parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by
the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct
causes therein.").
57. See Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981) ("The pre-
eminent generalization that emerges from this Court's precedents on an indi-
gent's right to appointed counsel is that such a right has been recognized to
exist only where the litigant may lose his physical liberty if he loses the litiga-
tion."); see also Comment, On Letting the Laity Litigate: The Petition Clause and
Unauthorized Practice Rules, 132 U. PA. L. REv., 1515, 1526 n.53 (1984) ("[T]he
courts have not interpreted the petition clause to impose a state duty to supply
an attorney to civil litigants."). But cfJoan Grace Ritchey, Note, Limits on Justice:
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federal courts have discretionary authority, as a matter of due
process and statute, to request counsel for unrepresented plain-
tiffs in particular cases; the courts' decision to exercise this
authority is guided by the interests at stake and public concerns
that may weigh against providing counsel.58 In addition, federal
statutes authorize, but do not oblige, the federal courts to grant
in forma pauperis status, waiving filing and service fees, if the
facts of the case warrant. 59
In Coppedge v. United States, the Supreme Court held that the
same standard of frivolousness governs fee-paid as in forma
pauperis appeals, explaining that "[t]he point of equating the
test for allowing a pauper's [case] to the test for dismissing paid
cases, is to assure equality of consideration for all litigants."60
Despite this emphasis on formal, rather than, functional equality,
the Court has also recognized that pro se litigants may require
different or special treatment from the legal system at different
stages of an action. For example, the Court has held that district
courts are to assess pro se pleadings by "less stringent standards
than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers."'" Moreover, the
Court has held that district courts must consider whether to
The United States'Failure to Recognize a Right to Counsel in Civil Litigation, 79 WASH.
U. L.Q. 317, 318 (2001) ("[V]irtually all other mature industrialized societies
are far more progressive than the United States in their protection of the right
to counsel for all members of society, regardless of income.").
58. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (Supp. 2001) (providing that a court can
request but cannot require an attorney to represent an indigent litigant); Mal-
lard v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296 (1989) (holding that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)
does not authorize a federal court to require an unwilling attorney to represent
an indigent civil litigant); see also Rhode, supra note 2, at 1788 ("Although
courts have discretion to appoint counsel where necessary to assure due pro-
cess, they have done so only in a narrow category of cases, and legislatures have
guaranteed compensation for a still more limited number of matters."); Han-
son & Daley, supra note 45, at 14 (reporting that federal courts appointed coun-
sel in only four percent of sampled habeas corpus cases from 1992).
Appointment of counsel in a habeas corpus proceeding is governed by the
Criminal Justice Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(2) (B) (1994).
59. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1966). See generally HERSHKOFF & LoFFREDO,
supra note 28, 318-23 nn. 31-69 (1997) (discussing state and federal law gov-
erning the right of the poor to secure access to justice).
60. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 447 (1962).
61. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). See generally Julie M.
Bradlow, Procedural Due Process Rights of Pro Se Civil Litigants, 55 U. CHI. L. REv.
659, 660 (1988) (arguing that, in pro se civil litigation, "a discretionary regime
should be preserved, in the sense that the question of how much process is due
in any given case should be resolved by means of a sliding scale" reflective of
the attendant circumstances).
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grant leave to amend prior to dismissing a pro se complaint.6" In
addition, at least some district courts have adopted local rules
governing treatment of pro se parties at the summary judgment
stage of an action.63 With respect to inmates seeking to file civil
actions pro se, the Court, at various times and with varying
degrees of sympathy, has emphasized that "the fundamental con-
stitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities
to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal
papers."64 However, in 1996, Congress enacted the Prison Litiga-
tion Reform Act, which changes in significant ways the trial and
appellate courts' processing of prisoner petitions, whether pro se
or represented, in forma pauperis or fee-paid, 65 and the Act has
been interpreted as reflecting a "concern[ ] with filtering out
frivolous suits administratively, before they get to court. "66
62. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 34 (1992). But see Lopez v.
Smith, 160 F.3d 567, 571 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that under the 1996 Prison
Litigation Reform Act, "a court can no longer, at its discretion, provide an
opportunity for the pro se prisoner-litigant proceeding in forma pauperis to
amend deficiencies in his complaint").
63. S.D.N.Y. Civ. R. 56.2 & E.D.N.Y. Civ. R. 56.2 (requiring the defendant
to provide notice to a pro se plaintiff of the need to oppose a motion for sum-
mary judgment with affidavits or other papers).
64. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). But see Nancy Biro, Supple-
ment to Meeting the Challenge of Pro Se Litigation: An Update of Legal and Ethical
Issues (updated Aug. 2000), available at http://www.ajs.org/prose/Kerry%20
Update.htm (observing that pro se prison litigants "find it very difficult to pro-
ceed..., their access to legal materials is rather limited... [and they] ... often
face . . . restrictive prison rules and regulations.").
65. See Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-134, Title
VIII, § 804((a), (c)-(e), 110 Stat. 1321-73, 1321-74, 1321-75 (enacted April 26,
1996). The Act amends a number of statutes involving fee waiver and the grant-
ing of in forma pauperis status, criteria for case screening, case management,
and dismissal, limitations on relief, attorney fees, and sanctions. See 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3624(b) and (b)(2), 3626 (nt); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915
(a)-(h), 1346(b) and (b)(2); and 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(16)-(a)(17). For a dis-
cussion of the PLRA and how it affects the processing of prisoner petitions, see
Michael Zachary, Dismissal of Federal Actions and Appeals Under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1915(E)(2) and 1915A(B) 42 U.S.C. § 1997E(C) and the Inherent Authority of the
Federal Courts: (A) Procedures for Screening and Dismissing Cases; (B) Special Problems
Posed by the "Delusional" or "Wholly Incredible" Complaint, 43 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv.
975 (1999-2000); see also Lois Bloom, Implementation of the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, in 16TH ANNUAL SEGTION 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION 2000, at 605
(PLI Litig. and Admin. Practice Course, Handbook Series No. 640, 2000).
66. Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95, 103 (2d Cir. 2000). The Act had an
immediate impact on the federal courts. See Long-term Effects of Prisoner Litigation
Reform Act Not Yet Clear, in The Third Branch 5 (July 1997) (stating that "federal
question civil-rights prisoner petitions declined to their lowest lowel in five
years" following enactment of the Act, but noting that "[w] hether the PLRA was
responsible for this decrease, and if so, whether the downward trend will con-
tinue, are questions that cannot yet be fully answered").
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C. Article III Responses to Pro Se Litigation
Institutional reforms within the federal courts also shape the
Article III response to pro se litigation. Congress has mandated
that alternative dispute mechanisms are to be available in each of
the federal districts;67 it has provided funding for central staff
and pro se clerks whose job is to screen filings, to help locate
counsel, and to assist pro se litigants;68 and it has authorized the
appointment of magistrate judges to serve as adjuncts to the dis-
67. In 1998, Congress required the federal courts to establish and imple-
ment a program of alternative dispute resolution. See Alternative Dispute Reso-
lution Act of 1998, 28 U.S.C.A. § 651 (Supp. 2001). See Cheryl L. Baber,
Alternative Dispute Resolution in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Oklahoma, 36 TULSA L.J. 819, 820 (2001) (explaining that alternative dispute
techniques include "arbitration, mediation, mini-trials, early neutral evaluation,
or some combination of those for certain civil cases"). Even before the Act,
certain districts had ADR programs in place. Id. at 822.
68. See 28 U.S.C. § 715 (1993) ("The Chief Judge of each court of
appeals, with the approval of the Court, may appoint a senior staff attorney...
staff attorneys and secretarial and clerical employees. .. ."). The number of
pro se staff attorneys allotted per district is determined by a formula based on
the number of prisoner filings in the court annually. Each court makes use of
the pro se staff attorneys as it sees fit. Many districts limit pro se staff attorney
work to prisoner filings, but others require pro se staff attorneys to review all
pro se filings. In some districts, pro se staff attorneys work on a case from
inception through dispositive motion or trial; in others, pro se staff attorneys
are limited to the screening of complaints at the inception of the case and
making recommendations for sua sponte dismissal. See, e.g., CARROLL SERON,
THE ROLE OF MAGISTRATES: NINE CASE STUDIES 85 (1985) [hereinafter SERON,
NINE CASE STUDIES] (explaining that in some districts, the pro se clerk "does
much of the initial screening including in forma pauperis (IFP) petitions, and
does some legal research on motions before a magistrate prepares a report and
recommendation for ajudge"). See generally Recommendations for Expediting Pro Se
Litigation, Pro Se Law Clerks and Staff Attorneys Association (1994). For a criti-
cism of the use of central staff, see Wade H. McCree, Jr., Bureaucratic Justice: An
Early Warning, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 777, 787 (1981) (referring to the growth of
central staff attorneys as "cancerous"). For discussions of institutional adapta-
tions by the U.S. Courts of Appeals, see MARILYN M. DUCHARME, PRO SE APPEALS:
PRO SE PROCESSING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS (1995); Thomas E. Baker,
Intramural Reforms: How the U.S. Courts of Appeals Have Helped Themselves, 22 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 913 (1995); Arthur D. Hellman, Central Staff in Appellate Courts:
The Experience of the Ninth Circuit, 68 CAL. L. REv. 937 (1980). For criticisms of
these developments, see Jeffrey 0. Cooper & Douglas A. Berman, Passive Virtues
and Casual Vices in the Federal Courts ofAppeals, 66 BROOK. L. REv. 685, 699 (2000)
(arguing that "the filtering of the case through a single individual in a central
office does tend to reduce the likelihood that the case will receive a full, fresh
look in the chambers of each judge on the panel"); William M. Richman &
William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari: Requiem for the
Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 276 (1996) (noting that, for so-
called disfavored cases, circuit judges' involvement "probably consists of limited
review of the staff recommendations").
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trictjudges in the handling and disposition of criminal and civil
filings.69 These innovations are structurally interrelated,7" but
we focus here on the use of magistrate judges in helping to
resolve pro se cases.
Established in 1968,1 the position of magistrate judge
evolved from the office of commissioner that existed in the Arti-
cle III system since the eighteenth-century.72 The appointment
of magistrate judges provides a temporary and flexible solution
to expanding dockets, obviating immediate pressures to increase
the number of Article III judges.7" In their original incarnation,
"magistrates were limited to hearing nondispositive motions and
69. See infra notes 71-89 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., Patrick E. Longan, Bureaucratic Justice Meets ADR. The Emerging
Role for Magistrates as Mediators, 73 NEB. L. REv. 712 (1994) (discussing the role
of magistrate judges as mediators in federal court alternative dispute resolution
programs).
71. See United States Magistrates Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-578, Title I,
§ 101, 82 Stat. 1108 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-639 (Supp.
2001)); see also Phillip M. Pro & Thomas C. Hnatowski, Measured Progress: The
Evolution and Administration of the Federal Magistrate Judges System, 44 AM. U. L.
REv. 1503, 1504 (1995) ("The Federal Magistrates Act of 1968 . .. represented
the culmination of years of joint effort by Congress and the federal judiciary to
improve the quality of justice and to expedite the disposition of the growing
caseloads of the federal courts."); Joseph F. Spaniol, Jr., The Federal Magistrates
Act: History and Development, 1974 Amiz. ST. L.J. 565, 565 (recounting the history
of the Federal Magistrate Act of 1968).
72. Richard W. Peterson, The Federal Magistrates Act: A New Dimension in the
Implementation of Justice, 56 IowA L. REv. 62, 62-69 (1970) (presenting English
and colonial origins to the U.S. commissioner system, and its relation to the
federal magistrates); Judith Resnik, Rereading "The Federal Courts" Revising the
Domain of Federal Courts Jurisprudence at the End of the Twentieth Century, 47 VAND.
L. REV. 1021, 1029 (1994) ("In 1968, Congress transformed the 'commissioner'
system into a corps of judicial officials named federal 'magistrates.'"). See gener-
ally Linda Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts Revisited: Masters and Magistrates in the Fed-
eral Courts of the United States, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON CRVILJUSTICE:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SIR JACK I. H. JACOB Q.C. 129, 129-68 (I.R. Scott ed.,
1990); Linda Silberman, Masters and Magistrates, Part I The English Model, 50
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1070 (1975); Linda Silberman, Masters and Magistrates, Part II:
The American Analogue, 50 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1297 (1975).
73. See Longan, supra note 70, at 718 (observing that the magistrate sys-
tem needs "to be flexible so that it can adapt to changing needs and possibili-
ties"). See generally HENRYJ. FRiENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW
29 (1973) ("Inflation of the number of district judges ... will result, by its own
Gresham's law, in a depreciation of the judicial currency and the consequent
impairment of the prestige and of the efficiency of the federal courts." (quoting
Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 59 (1954) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)); Richard A. Posner, Coping with the Caseload: A Comment on Magis-
trates and Masters, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2215, 2216 (1989) (stating that the appoint-
ment of adjuncts such as magistrates is inevitable given "effort[s] to circumvent
the natural limits on expanding the federal court system").
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conducting pre-trial conferences and hearings, [and] final deci-
sionmaking authority in all cases was reserved for the federal
judge."74 In 1976, responding to judicial uncertainty about the
scope of magistrate authority, Congress clarified that the district
courts could assign to magistrates, even without party consent,
"such additional duties as are not inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion and laws of the United States."75 Three years later, aiming
to "improve access to the courts for all groups, especially the less-
advantaged, ' 76 Congress enlarged the scope of magistrate
authority, expanding their jurisdiction to include, on consent of
the parties, "any or all proceedings, in ajury or nonjury civil mat-
ter."77 The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 further enhances
magistrate authority, conferring increased status through the for-
mal designation of "Magistrate Judge. 78
Currently, magistrate judges "exercise the key powers of dis-
trict court judges: they decide motions, take evidence, instruct
juries, and render final decisions." 79 The district court may refer
any nondispositive matter to a magistrate judge without party
consent but retains jurisdiction to "reconsider any pretrial mat-
ter" for clear error."0 In addition, on consent of the parties, mag-
74. J. Anthony Downs, Comment, The Boundaries of Article III: Delegation of
Final Decisionmaking Authority to Magistrates, 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 1032, 1032
(1985).
75. See Pub. L. No. 94-577, 90 Stat. 2729, 2729 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(3) (1993)).
76. S. REP. No. 95-344, at 4 (1977).
77. See Pub. L. No. 96-82, 93 Stat. 643 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 631-39 (1982)); T. Michael Putnam, The Utilization of Magistrate Judges in the
Federal District Courts of Alabama, 28 CuMB. L. REV. 635, 639 (1997-1998) (calling
the authorization of magistrate consent jurisdiction in 1979 a "truly revolution-
ary change in the status of magistrate judges"). On the constitutional signifi-
cance of party consent, and whether it cures separation of powers problems,
compare id. at 641 ("Although the Supreme Court has not yet addressed
directly the constitutional sufficiency of consent ... at least one case hints that
consent is an adequate basis for delegating Article III judicial power as long as
the Article III court retains ultimate jurisdiction over the case or controversy.")
(internal citation omitted) with Richard A. Posner, Coping with the Caseload, A
Comment on Magistrates and Masters, supra note 73, at 2216 ("[The parties'] con-
sent may well eliminate any concern founded on the due process clause of the
fifth amendment; it is irrelevant (or largely so) to the concerns that animated
Article III.").
78. The Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 1, 104
Stat. 5089 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). Dessem
notes that the 1990 Act's expansion of magistrates' authority was contrary to the
recommendations of the Brookings Institute Task Force on Civil Justice
Reform. See Dessem, supra note 8, at 810-11.
79. Downs, supra note 75, at 1033.
80. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1) (A) (1993).
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istrate judges may decide dispositive motions; 8' the magistrate's
decision is entered as a judgment of the court and is subject to
appeal in the normal course to the court of appeals.8 2 If the par-
ties do not consent to the magistrate judge's dispositive civil au-
thority, the districtjudge can nevertheless refer the matter to the
magistrate judge, who then issues a report and recommendation
which, upon objection, is reviewed de novo by the district court.83
81. Some commentators question whether pro se or indigent litigants can
provide meaningful consent to disposition by a magistrate judge. Congress-
woman Elizabeth Holtzman, opposing passage of the 1979 Act, expressed skep-
ticism that an indigent litigant would freely waive his or her right to an Article
III decisionmaker:
It is unlikely that a litigant will hold out for an Article III judge when
he or she is poor or denied bail or is suing for badly needed money
and is told by an attorney that with a magistrate the trial will be sched-
uled sooner and conducted more expeditiously. In cases where a law-
yer is not required, it is even less likely that party could resist the lure
of speed and economy.
H.R. REP. No. 95-1364, at 42 (1978). See also Christopher E. Smith, Assessing the
Consequences ofludicial Innovation: U.S. Magistrates' Trials and Related Tribulations,
23 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 455, 476 (1988) ("There is a risk that poor litigants
inevitably will be pressured into consenting to a magistrates' trial authority
because these litigants cannot afford to wait for their cases to be heard by dis-
trict judges.") [hereinafter Smith, Assessing the Consequences]. The Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990 facilitates the securing of party consent, and districts
use a number of techniques for this purpose. See generally MAGISTRATE JUDGES
Dtv., ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS., FACILITATING CONSENT TO THE EXERCISE OF
CASE-DISPOSITrvE AUTHORITY By MAGISTRATE JUDGES IN CIVIL CASES (1999)
(Report on file with Lois Bloom, United States District Court, Eastern District of
New York). The use of statutory judges could become problematic in that "a
radical shift to trial by magistrate could easily result in a finding of unconstitu-
tionality . . . ." Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1045
(7th Cir. 1984).
82, 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). The Court has not yet reviewed the constitution-
ality of magistrate judge civil case-dispositive authority, which has been upheld
by all of the circuits that have considered its legality. See Fields v. Washington
Metro. Area Transit Auth., 743 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Goldstein v. Kelleher,
728 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1984); Collins v. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1984);
Wharton-Thomas v. United States, 721 F.2d 922 (3d Cir. 1983); Gairola v.
Comm'r of Virginia Dep't of Gen. Servs., 753 F.2d 1281 (4th Cir. 1985); Puryear
v. Ede's Ltd., 731 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1984); Bell & Beckwith v. United States,
766 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1985); K.M.C. Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 757 F.2d 752 (6th
Cir. 1985); Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir.
1984); Lehman Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc. v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 739 F.2d
1313 (8th Cir. 1984); Orsini v. Wallace, 913 F.2d 474 (8th Cir. 1990); Pace-
maker Diagnostic Clinic of America, Inc. v. Instromedix, Inc., 725 F.2d 537 (9th
Cir. 1984) (en banc); Sinclair v. Wainwright, 814 F.2d 1516 (11th Cir. 1987);
D.L. Auld Co. v. Chroma Graphics Corp., 753 F.2d 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
83. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1) (B). Accord Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985)
(holding that failure to file timely objection to the magistrate's report and rec-
ommendation generally waives any further Article III review).
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District courts make varied use of magistrates in the han-
dling and resolution of civil matters, depending on their docket
needs, internal organization, and judicial philosophies.14 Almost
all districts, however, assign some pro se filings-mostly habeas
corpus petitions and Social Security appeals-to magistrate
judges for handling and recommended disposition." The Fed-
eral Judicial Center points to three major case management
approaches to the allocation of such work: blanket reference of
all Social Security appeals and prisoner petitions to magistrate
judges; allocation of Social Security appeals and prisoner peti-
tions between magistrate and Arbtcle III judges; and selective
assignment of Social Security appeals and prisoner petitions by
individual Article III judges to magistrate judges.8 6 Finally, in
some districts the chief magistrate judge supervises the pro se law
clerks.87
In the ten-year period from 1982 to 1992, the number of
prisoner petitions handled by magistrates increased by forty-six
percent; and in the single year from 1992 to 1993, by ten per-
cent.8" As a result of these developments, magistrate judges have
assumed an increasing share of the federal court's work, and
shoulder an even larger share of the pro se docket. As Judith
Resnik reports, "Although relatively invisible, . . . magistrate
84. See CARROLL SERON, THE ROLES OF MAGISTRATES IN THE FEDERAL Dis-
TRICT COURTS vii (1983) [hereinafter SERON, ROLES OF MAGISTRATES] ("The
United States magistrates system has developed into a structure that responds to
each district court's particular circumstances and needs."); LindaJ. Silberman,
Judicial Adjuncts Revisited: The Proliferation of Ad Hoc Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REv.
2131, 2139 (1989) ("[T] he use of magistrates varies substantially from district to
district-often depending upon the caseload demands of the particular district
and the district's organizational philosophy about the relationship between
judge and magistrate."). One writer, considering a survey of district court prac-
tice, suggests a three-part typology of function: (1) the magistrate functioning
as generalist, with his or her own docket of cases; (2) the magistrate as special-
ist, handling particular categories of cases, such as Social Security appeals or
prisoner petitions; and (3) the magistrate as a member of an adjudicative team,
making recommendations on specified pretrial or other matters. See A. Leo
Levin, Foreword to SERON, NINE CASE STUDIES, supra note 69, at x.
85. See SERON, ROLES OF MAGISTRATES, supra note 84, at ix (reporting that
among 191 full-time magistrates in eighty-two districts surveyed, eighty-eight
percent handled prisoners' habeas corpus petitions and civil rights cases and
eighty-six percent handled Social Security cases).
86. See SERON, NINE CASE STUDIES, supra note 69, at 84. For a general
discussion of the processing of pro se cases in the Southern District of Florida,
see Unusual Programs Help Southern District of lorida Deal with Pro Se Cases, 9 FJC
DIRECTIONS 20 (1996).
87. See SERON, NINE CASE STUDIES, supra note 69, at 85 (reporting that the
Northern District of Georgia uses magistrates in this way).
88. Longan, supra note 70, at 753.
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judges do a vast amount of federal adjudication .... Magistrate
judges preside over some 500,000judicial proceedings, including
social security 'appeals,' habeas petitions, evidentiary hearings,
pretrial conferences, and more than 5000 civil trials, heard on
the consent of the parties."89
II.
The Eastern District of New York, one of the most populated
and busiest judicial districts in the United States, has shared in
the developments set out in Part I. Like other state and federal
courts, it has experienced a tremendous rise in case filings across
the board and in pro se matters in particular. The district has
also adapted institutionally to meet the demands and challenges
that its rising caseload creates, while also seeking to conserve
Article III power as a scarce public resource. In May 2001, the
district took the innovative step of designating a specific magis-
trate judge to handle assigned categories of pro se filings. At the
same time, the district made accompanying changes to the
organization of its pro se staff attorneys and writ clerks to assist in
the processing of civil filings by unrepresented litigants. In this
Part, we briefly describe some of the special circumstances of the
Eastern District of New York, and explore the scope and content
of the new magistrate judge's responsibilities.
A. A Snapshot of the Eastern District of New York
Spanning the counties of Kings, Queens, and Richmond in
New York City, and Nassau and Suffolk Counties on Long Island,
with courthouses in Brooklyn and Central Islip, the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York is one of the most densely populated judicial
districts in the entire country. According to the 2000 Census, the
district's population increased 8.5% since 1990, by over
650,000.90 The district's large population contributes to its large
caseload, with its weighted filings in 2000 ranking eleventh in the
United States and first in the Second Circuit.9" In 1999, total
89. Resnik, supra note 73, at 1026. She adds in a later work:
During the following decade [between 1990 and 1999], the number of
full-time magistrate judges rose from 307 to 447; by 1999 in ten dis-
tricts, the number of magistrate judges was greater than the number
of life-tenured judges. Some districts also put magistrate judges 'on
the wheel,' assigned directly to civil cases, as are district judges.
Resnik, supra note 39, at 990.
90. See UNITED STATES COURTS, SECOND CIRCUIT REPORT 2000, at 19
(2000) [hereinafter SECOND CIRCUIT REPORT] (citing statistics and providing
geographic parameters of the E.D.N.Y.).
91. See id.
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civil case filings rose to 8000.92 Of these, 1,217, about fifteen per-
cent, were pro se cases.9 3 Of the pro se cases, prisoners filed 783,
632 cases seeking writs of habeas corpus and 151 cases suing to
vindicate civil rights.9 4 Pro se litigants who were not incarcerated
filed 154 employment discrimination cases, 136 civil rights cases,
and 144 Social Security cases.9 5
The Eastern District of New York has grown incrementally to
meet the demands of increased docket pressures. In 1938, the
district had six authorized judges and no magistrates.9 6 Fifty
years later, the number of authorized judgeships had doubled to
twelve, with four additional senior judges and five full-time mag-
istrates.9 7 Today, the court has grown even more, with twenty-
one judges, six of whom have senior status.98 The most recent
Second Circuit Report emphasizes the fact that within the East-
ern District of New York "the workload remained a crushing one
due to an insufficient number of active judges," and points to
Congress's failure to act upon the district's request for three
additional judgeships.9 9 Growth in case filings has been accom-
panied by an increased delegation of pretrial and other matters
to magistrates, described by a senior judge as "a remarkably able
and dedicated group." "° In 2000, over 6,000 pending civil cases
were referred to magistrate judges for pretrial preparation and
final disposition, including trial on consent of the parties. 10 1
92. Materials on file with Lois Bloom, United States District Court, East-
em District of New York.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. Employment claims filed by non-prisoners include complaints
filed under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 17
(1994 & Supp. V 1999); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, as
amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994 & Supp. V 1999); and The Americans
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994 & Supp. V 1999); other
civil rights cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. V 1999); and
appeals from adverse Social Security and Supplemental Security Income deci-
sions under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1994 & Supp. V 1999); 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c) (3)
(1994 & Supp. V 1999).
96. See Weinstein & Wiener, supra note 17, at 430.
97. Id. (citing statistics). Districtjudges may retain the office, but retire
from regular service after attaining sixty-five years of age and fifteen years of
service. See 28 U.S.C. § 371 (Supp. 2001). Such status is colloquially referred
to as "senior status." Senior district judges may elect not to be assigned catego-
ries of cases.
98. SECOND CIRCUIT REPORT, supra note 91, at 20.
99. Id.
100. Weinstein & Wiener, supra note 17, at 437-38.
101. SECOND CIRCUIT REPORT, supra note 91, at 20.
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B. The Evolving Approach to Pro Se Claims
Like other federal districts, the Eastern District of New York
over the years has adopted case management and other devices
to meet the demands of increased civil case filings and the chal-
lenges of pro se litigation.
For the last twenty years, the Eastern District of New York
employed pro se staff attorneys and writ clerks, technically a part
of the Chief Judge's staff, but working under the supervision of
the Clerk of the Court."°2 Their work included a broad mix of
activities, such as preparing case summaries for pro bono refer-
rals; responding to procedural questions by pro se litigants; and
reviewing default judgments and preparing civiljudgments in all
cases.' °3 In addition, particular staff attorneys undertook legal
research at the request of judicial officers. 10 4
During this period, the Eastern District of New York ran-
domly assigned all pro se cases to the active district judges of the
court. Each pro se case was also assigned to a magistrate judge.
Thus, in practice, pro se cases were assigned, at the time of filing,
to both an Article III and a magistrate judge, and the district
judge would decide on a case by case basis whether and to what
extent to utilize a magistrate. 5  This case management
approach was consistent with the treatment of represented par-
ties in the district: generally, all civil matters were referred to a
magistrate judge for pretrial handling.'0 6
C. Appointing a Special Magistrate Judge
In May 2001, the Eastern District of New York appointed a
new, additional magistrate judge with a specific mandate: to over-
see the court's pro se docket. In designing this new position, the
district made strategic choices aimed at securing greater effi-
ciency for the court overall and high quality decisionmaking for
pro se litigants. The court also reorganized its pro se staff attor-
neys and writ clerks with an eye toward the prompt and effective
screening of all pro se cases filed in the district in order to iden-
tify and draft orders in those cases that might be appropriate for
sua sponte dismissal. By so doing, the district could direct
102. Materials on file with Lois Bloom, United States District Court, East-
em District of New York.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See generally E.D.N.Y. Clv. R. 72.1 & 72.2.
106. Id.
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greater attention to those pro se cases involving potentially meri-
torious claims."' 7
The new magistrate judge's function is essentially two-fold.
First, the magistrate judge, rather than the clerk of the court,
now oversees a Pro Se Office comprising staff attorneys and writ
clerks who are intended to serve a number of integrated func-
tions. Most important, under supervision of the new magistrate
judge, the pro se staff attorneys will screen all pro se civil filings
and propose sua sponte dismissal orders to the assigned judge
prior to the issuance of a summons.'0 8 They will also routinely
draft orders in cases that are insufficiently pleaded but not
appropriate for sua sponte dismissal, generally directing the liti-
gant to amend the complaint. In addition, the pro se staff will
provide procedural advice to individuals seeking to file claims or
litigating their claims before the court, through such activities as
answering questions about civil procedure and making forms and
instructions available for pleadings and motions. Finally, the pro
se staff will respond to inquiries made to judge's chambers when
requested by thejudge.'°9 Second, the district will now automati-
cally refer all pro se cases that survive screening, other than
Social Security appeals and federal prisoner petitions seeking
habeas corpus relief, to the new magistrate judge. She is respon-
sible for handling all pretrial matters in such cases and may hold
any conferences and hearings that are required. She may also
preside at trial with the consent of the parties.' 10 In carrying out
107. Id.
108. See Vanderberg v. Donaldson, 259 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2001)
(upholding 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) (2) (B) (ii), as amended by the Prison Litigation
Reform Act, which allows the district court to dismiss sua sponte before service
of process, a claim of an in forma pauperis plaintiff for failure to state a claim);
see also Christiansen v. Clarke, 147 F.3d 655 (8th Cir. 1998).
109. Materials on file with Lois Bloom, United States District Court, East-
ern District of New York.
110. The new pro se magistrate judge has established a procedure by
which she raises the issue of consent in her order granting in forma pauperis
status. The order states:
This information regarding the availability of a magistrate judge to
hear the entire case on consent of the parties is not meant to, in any
way, interfere with the parties' absolute right to decision by a United
States District Judge. This is an option available to the parties, which
may expedite adjudication of this case and preserve scarce judicial
resources.
Materials on file with Lois Bloom, United States District Court, Eastern District
of New York. The parties are then given a separate paper to sign to register
their consent. See Aldrich v. Bowen, 130 F.3d 1364, 1364 (9th Cir. 1997) (find-
ing that a magistrate judge's judgment was invalid where the record contained
"no written consent of the parties as required").
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this assignment, the new magistrate judge is assisted by two
"elbow" law clerks and also supervises the pro se staff attorneys
and writ clerks."'
The Eastern District of New York's approach thus reallocates
the pro se caseload-in particular, state prisoners' habeas peti-
tions and employment discrimination claims-away from all
other judicial officers to a single initial decisionmaker who has
multi-faceted responsibility for screening, processing, conferenc-
ing, and recommendations for disposition. One goal of this
approach is to ensure early identification of those pro se cases
that should be quickly terminated; those that need to be
repleaded; and those that need to be transferred to another dis-
trict. By centralizing initial decisionmaking in a judicial officer,
assisted by a cadre of lawyers, the proposal seeks to foster the
development of substantive and procedural expertise in the areas
of law that predominate the bulk of pro se filings in the Eastern
District of New York. New elbow clerks for individual judges are
thus largely relieved of the responsibility of having to learn the
intricacies of habeas corpus doctrine each year. In addition, the
approach diversifies the new magistrate judge's caseload, by
including employment discrimination and other civil rights
claims along with prisoner petitions.
III.
The Eastern District of New York's model for managing pro
se litigation uses the tools of centralization and specialization in
an effort to promote the fair and efficient processing of claims by
unrepresented litigants. The court's goal is to terminate frivo-
lous cases quickly, so it can expend greater attention on meritori-
ous cases that may be deserving of court-ordered relief. The
assignment of these cases to a judicial officer rather than to the
clerk of the court underscores the serious attention that the
court expects pro se matters to receive. However, with no track
record, there is no predicting how the work of the office will
affect litigants. Although the district judges are required to
review the new magistrate judge's reports and recommendations
111. Ordinarily, a magistrate judge is allotted one law clerk, one secre-
tary, and one deputy clerk (sometimes referred to as a courtroom deputy or
case manager). Under certain circumstances, ajudge may elect to hire an addi-
tional law clerk in lieu of administrative staff. See GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICIES
AND PROCEDURES, VOL. II-A, JUDGES MANUAL, CH. 1, CHAMBERS STAFF, PART A:
PERSONNEL AUTHORIZED, § 1.D (Sept. 1999).
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using a de novo standard," 2 one might nevertheless argue that
the disposition of pro se cases in this way effectively relieves Arti-
cle III judges of responsibility for areas of law that raise key fed-
eral concerns, including habeas corpus petitions and
employment discrimination claims. The Eastern District of New
York's approach to pro se cases could thus unintentionally stifle
Article III jurisprudence by shielding district court judges from
issues that disproportionately impact people without means. We
might also predict racial implications given the high incidence of
poverty and incarceration among people of color."' Over time,
this concern may argue in favor of alternate systems in which
Article III judges share greater responsibility to hear and to
decide pro se matters. In this Part, we explore possible policy
and ethical concerns raised by the district's pro se program, relat-
ing to specialization, efficiency, and impartiality,' 14 recognizing
112. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Estelle, 711 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1983) (remand-
ing case because of district court's failure to make an independent determina-
tion regarding the magistrate's factual findings).
113. See Mary Becker, Towards a Progressive Politics and a Progressive Consti-
tution, 69 FoRDHAM L. REV. 2007, 2010 (2001) ("We have the highest incarcera-
tion rate of any country in the world, and disproportionately our prisoners are
African American."). On cutbacks in funding to investigate bias in the federal
courts, see RacHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., 2001 SUPPLEMENT TO HART & WECHS-
LER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 2 (4th ed.) (2001) (citing
articles).
114. We do not address the possible constitutional concerns raised by a
procedure that for reasons of economy and expedition refers virtually all pro se
cases to a decisionmaker who lacks the independence that Article III affords
through the guarantee of lifetime tenure. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S.
667, 683 (1980) (holding that the delegation of judicial authority to a magis-
trate judge comports with Article III "so long as the ultimate decision is made
by the district court"); cf Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline
Co., 458 U.S. 50, 77, 92 (1982) (emphasizing the need to retain "'the essential
attributes of the judicial power' in art. III tribunals" to pass constitutional mus-
ter, and distinguishing between Congress's power with respect to state-law
claims and federally created rights (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 51
(1932))). For a general discussion, see MAGISTRATEJUDGES Div., ADMIN. OFF. OF
THE U.S. CTS., A Constitutional Analysis of Magistrate Judge Authority, 150 F.R.D.
247 (1993) [hereinafter A Constitutional Analysis]. The Magistrate Judges Divi-
sion concluded that, "[w ] hile predicting the outcome of future Supreme Court
cases is a risky proposition, there appears to be little likelihood that significant
elements of existing magistrate judge authority will be declared unconstitu-
tional." Id. at 272; see also Downs, supra note 74, at 1034 (arguing that "the
[Federal Magistrate] Act] 's constitutionality should not be considered settled").
Whether the constitutional analysis is affected by the special circumstances of
the pro se docket, as they relate to litigant consent or to Article III oversight, see,
e.g., Vincent Aug, Jr., The Magistrate Act of 1979: From a Magistrate's Perspective, 49
U. CIN. L. REv. 363, 367-68 (1980) (discussing the practice "of some district
judges . .. [of] forcing litigants to resolve disfavored cases before a magistrate
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that the work of the magistrate judge to oversee the pro se
caseload in the Eastern District of New York is still in its infancy.
A. Concerns about Specialization
The Eastern District of New York takes a specialist approach
to the magistrate judge's function, assigning only pro se matters,
which some may regard as burdensome or disfavored, to the
newly appointed judicial officer. It thus runs counter to recent
suggestions by the Magistrate Judge's Committee of the Judicial
Conference as to how best to utilize magistrate judges. "Absent
unusual circumstances," the Committee explains, "a court nor-
mally benefits most from developing and using the full array of
judicial skills of its magistrate judges rather than assigning them
only specified case categories."' 1 5 Specialization may carry dis-
tinct advantages and disadvantages in the context of magistrate
judge jurisdiction. On the one hand, commentators warn that
the assignment of only Social Security cases or prisoner petitions
is likely to be "repetitive" and could produce "less careful judg-
ments" by the magistrate judges charged with their disposi-
tion.'1 6 On the other hand, at least one important commentator
questions whether Article III judges would give such matters any
closer attention.' 1 7 In this section, we explore the advantages
and disadvantages of the Eastern District of New York's
approach, recognizing that experience will prove or disprove
some of these theoretical considerations.
1. The Literature on Specialization
Judicial specialization is a term of art that typically refers to
courts of limited, and often exclusive,jurisdiction in a prescribed
subject matter.1 18 Commentators maintain that judicial speciali-
zation promotes efficiency and expertise, emphasizing three pri-
by intimations of lengthy delays should the litigants exercise their right to
appear before the court"), remains an open question.
115. SUGGESTIONS FOR UTILIZATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGES, supra note 14,
at 2.
116. See Smith, Assessing the Consequences, supra note 81, at 484.
117. See McCree, supra note 69, at 788 ("While I have no statistics to sup-
port my conjecture, I would not be surprised if the press of business might
tempt some judges to give the briefs in cases deemed unworthy ofjudicial atten-
tion a cursory look at best.").
118. See American Bar Association Central and East European Law Initia-
tive, Concept Paper on Specialized Courts (1996), available at http://www.abanet.
org/ceeli/conceptpapers/speccourts/spcl.html [hereinafter ABA Initiative]
("With reference to courts, specialization usually signifies that a court has lim-
ited, and frequently exclusive,jurisdiction in one or more specific fields of the
law.").
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mary benefits: the encouragement of high quality
decisionmaking, as specialist judges become expert in arcane or
technical areas of law;' 19 reduction of docket backlog, as general-
istjudges are relieved of the presumed tedium and weight of the
specialist's caseload; 120 and expedition of decision, as specialist
judges develop customized procedures and direct attention to
issues that might otherwise be relegated to the margins of the
court's docket.121 For these reasons, the Federal Courts Study
Committee in 1990 suggested the establishment of a specialized
court to resolve Social Security claims, explaining that "[t]he
interests of a class of vulnerable citizens are promoted, not sacri-
ficed, when a system of adjudication can be tailored to their par-
ticular needs." 122
The literature emphasizes, however, that specialization car-
ries potential costs: generalist judges no longer have to consider
particular areas of law, 123 while specialist judges risk being iso-
119. See Arie Freiberg, Problem-Oriented Courts: Innovative Solutions to Intrac-
table Problems?, 11 J.JUD. ADMIN. 8, 12 (2001) (stating that "[t]he advantages of
specialisation include improved judicial decision-making through the use of
judicial expertise, more efficient court processes ... and reduced backlogs in
the generalist courts.").
120. SeeJeffrey W. Stempel, Two Cheers for Specialization, 61 BROOK. L. REV.
67, 113 (1995) (stating that "a specialist judge might well preside over case
processing that is faster, less costly (in both judicial and attorney time), and
more frequently correct.").
121. See Silberman, supra note 85, at 2131, 2133 (discussing the develop-
ment of "ad hoc proceduralism" that departs from the uniformity of transsub-
stantive approaches); see, e.g., SERON, NINE CASE STUDIES, supra note 69, at 86
(reporting that it is "the practice of the magistrates [in the Northern District of
Georgia] to hold a hearing in Social Security cases" to resolve summary judg-
ment motions).
122. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, supra note 18, at
17. But see Edward V. Di Lello, Note, Fighting Fire with Firefighters: A Proposal for
Expert Judges at the Trial Level, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 473, 506 (1993) (expressing
concern that "[a] 'Social Security' judge . . . might lose sight of broader
values").
123. Owen Fiss warns that even generalist magistrates subject Article III
judges to this risk. "The use of the magistrate," he cautions, "insulates thejudge
from the presentation of the facts and the law on that particular issue, thus
accentuating the incompleteness of his perspective, and it relieves him of some
of his obligation to explain and justify." Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of
the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 1442, 1455 (1983). Accord McCree, supra note 69, at
780 ("We expect the judge, regardless of how inconsequential a case might
seem to be, to bring all his intellectual power and judgment to bear on the
issues before him, with the expectation that he will reach the correct result for
the right reasons."). But see Todd D. Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks onjudi-
cial Power in the Era of ManagerialJudging, 29 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 41, 112 (1995)
(recommending, as to pretrial management, "increased use of magistrate
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lated from the mainstream of legal thought.124 The specialist's
steady diet of routine matters may, moreover, tend toward "rou-
tinized decision making"'125 (with the attendant "risk of burnout
or stultification inherent in a severely limited docket"),1 26 com-
pounding problems of recruitment that are associated with lower
status judicial positions. 127 As applied to magistrate judges, the
empirical evidence about caseload specialization seems to be
mixed.12
8
The Eastern District of New York's model uses specialization
but is not specialist in the technical sense of limited subject mat-
ter. The new pro se magistrate judge reviews all cases involving
unrepresented litigants and manages broad categories of the pro
se docket. Any federal question case may be filed pro se, and the
filings range from the predominant habeas corpus petitions, to
the less frequent copyright and tax refund cases,' 29 so the docket
is therefore varied.'3 ' Adjudicating the many cases before the
pro se magistrate judge thus requires a broad knowledge of the
interplay between procedure and substance, as well as a firm
grounding in constitutional doctrine. Additionally, the district
judges [to] restore the possibility of review while separating the functions of
managing and substantive decision-making").
124. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Special-
ized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 3 (1989) ("Even with the best motives, a court's
doctrinal isolation may lead to a body of law out of tune with legal develop-
ments elsewhere.").
125. Smith, Judicial Lobbying, supra note 8, at 196.
126. SERON, NINE CASE STUDIES, supra note 69, at 112.
127. See Dreyfuss, supra note 125, at 3 (acknowledging the view that a spe-
cialist's "isolation, coupled with the repetitive nature of the workload, is
unlikely to attract the most talented jurists"). Accord ABA Initiative, supra note
119 ("[T]he narrowness of the work and the doctrinal isolation may make it
difficult to attract the most talented and qualified jurists to judicial careers.").
128. Compare SERON, NINE CASE STUDIES, supra note 69, at 88 (reporting
that in the Eastern District of Missouri, "delegation of Social Security and pris-
oner petitions to magistrates works smoothly, though they are difficult cases to
deal with on a repetitive basis"), with Smith, Assessing the Consequences, supra note
81, at 486 ("[O]ne district judge warned the author that 'I never let law clerks
handle prisoners' cases for too long because they become cynical about
them.'").
129. See, e.g., Miller v. U.S., 2000 WL 105864 (EDNY 2000) (tax refund);
cf. Rauma & Sutelan, supra note 20, at 9, fig. 6 (listing ten major categories of
non-prisoner pro se cases in ten federal districts for the period fiscal years
1991-1994).
130. Cf CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES IN THE FED-
ERAL COURTS: SUBORDINATE JUDGES 178 (1990) [hereinafter, SMITH, UNITED
STATES MAGISTRATES] ("Several judges [interviewed] said that they always give
their districts' magistrates an interesting variety of tasks so that the subordinate
judges do not become bored, stultified, and ineffective from only working on
prisoner and Social Security cases").
502 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 16
specifically excluded Social Security cases, which some magistrate
judges reportedly consider burdensome,' from the magistrate's
substantive assignment. 132 As to recruitment, in general the pool
of applicants for magistrate judges has increased substantially
over the years, as Congress and the courts accord the position
greater status and responsibility. l 3 Moreover, by establishing a
new position rather than allocating pro se matters to the existing
magistrate pool, the Eastern District of New York likely attracted
applications from lawyers who derive professional satisfaction
from working with the indigent and prison populations. Never-
theless, the concerns that commentators associate with specialist
courts are significant, and whether they will arise in the context
of the new magistrate judge will have to be monitored over time.
2. Structural Disadvantages for Pro Se Litigants
Some commentators warn that the use of magistrate judges
for pro se cases will lead to the "ghetto-ization" of indigent per-
sons' claims: 34 "the possibility of creating a two-track system of
justice-district judges for wealthy litigants and magistrates for
poor litigants." "' Although the appearance of disparate treat-
ment is significant in itself, we focus here on the content of such
treatment: whether the quality of decisionmaking by a magistrate
judge in a pro se case will be different from that of an Article III
judge and whether specialization puts the pro se litigant in a
structurally worse off position due to a greater risk that repeat
organizational players will capture the magistrate judge assigned
to the pro se docket."3 6
131. Cf SMITH, COURTS AND THE POOR, supra note 11, at 69 ("[A] lthough
some magistrates have a special interest in Social Security cases, many others
consider such cases boring and burdensome.").
132. Materials on file with Lois Bloom, United States District Court, East-
ern District of New York.
133. See A Constitutional Analysis, supra note 114, at 271-72 (finding a
"growing confidence in the magistrate judges system").
134. One commentator writes:
The slow, incremental broadening of magistrate judge authority
caused a degree of specialization, or 'ghetto-ization,' in many district
courts that resulted in magistrate judges' being limited to handling
preliminary criminal matters (such as those assigned to the earlier
commissioners), pro se prisoner litigation (both habeas corpus actions
and 'conditions of confinement' cases), and social security appeals."
Putnam, supra note 78, at 642-43 (footnotes omitted).
135. SMITH, COURTS AND THE POOR, supra note 11, at 53.
136. See Dreyfuss, supra note 125, at 3 (considering the argument that
"specialization will produce a court ... with judges . . . who are susceptible to
capture' by the bar that regularly practices before them"); Randall R. Rader,
Specialized Courts: The Legislative Response, 40 AM. U. L. REv. 1003, 1006 (1991)
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One might argue that Article III judges, as an independent
and elite corps within the federal system, will provide better, or at
least different, decisionmaking, from that of non-life tenured
judicial officers.1 37 Carroll Seron's nine case studies of district
court use of magistrates, although now fifteen years old, specifi-
cally examine the charge of "second-class attention," finding
"that when magistrates come to be seen by the bar as subject-
matter specialists-particularly in Social Security and prisoner
matters-lawyers often view the result as more careful and expert
attention.1 38  Moreover, David L. Shapiro's earlier study of
habeas corpus in the Massachusetts federal court gave high
marks to magistrates for their treatment of prisoner petitions:
In many instances, habeas corpus applications appear to
receive fuller and more careful consideration than they did
before magistrates came into office. District judges, in
turn, are relieved of a large share of a burden which they
tend to regard as weary, stale, flat, and unprofitable, are
able to focus on those few cases that raise important and
difficult questions.139
Other commentators likewise emphasize that at least some
magistrates are more likely than Article IIIjudges to expend time
on the pro se cases to which they are assigned, and thereby pro-
duce higher quality decisions.1 40 The empirical evidence so far is
(reciting criticism that a specialized court will "risk capture of a court by one
class of litigants or viewpoint").
137. See Fiss, supra note 124, at 1444 (stating that Article III judges are
"thought to be the fullest embodiment of the judicial ideal"). But see Stempel,
supra note 121, at 81 (suggesting that district courts in urban areas "may be on
their way to becoming specialized drug courts").
138. A. Leo Levin, Foreword to SERON, NINE CASE STUDIES, supra note 69, at
ix (1985).
139. David L. Shapiro, Federal Habeas Corpus: A Study in Massachusetts, 87
HARv. L. REv. 321, 366 (1973); see also Roger A. Hanson, What Should be Done
When Prisoners Want to Take the State to Court?, 70 JUDICATURE 223, 224 (1987)
(underscoring the lack of empirical support for the view that prisoner petitions
are resolved "hastily or without a careful consideration of the facts and the
law"). But see William Bennett Turner, When Prisoners Sue: A Study of Prisoner
Section 1983 Suits in the Federal Courts, 92 HARv. L. REv. 610, 625 (1979) ("There
are many indications that [prisoner petitions] were bureaucratically processed
rather than adjudicated.").
140. See Francis E. McGovern, Use of Masters and Magistrates in Complex Liti-
gation, in ADR AND THE COURTS: A MANUAL FOR JUDGES AND LAWYERS 221, 223
(1987) ("The increasing load of litigation necessarily reduces the amount of
time a judge has available for any given lawsuit. A master or magistrate has
more time to spend on a specific case.").
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inconclusive,1 4 ' and whether this concern turns out to be more
theoretical than real will turn, in part, on the motivation and
attitude of the new magistrate judge as she carries out her man-
date, as well as the scrutiny afforded by Article III review.
Commentators also emphasize another concern with
adjunct decisionmaking that relates to the structural position of
magistrate judges in the Article III hierarchy: dependent on the
district judges for their appointment, magistrate judges are said
to be more risk-averse and less likely than Article IIIjudges to be
innovative or to break new ground in their approach to legal
issues.142 Carroll Seron reports attorney perception that in one
district, magistrates go "'a bit more slowly' into new territory,"
and that their treatment of novel claims depends on "cues from
the judges in their district."1 4 3 On one reading, the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York's approach provides a "cue" that pro se matters
are important and to be accorded significant institutional
resources: a judge, rather than a court clerk, now oversees the
pro se office and supervises the screening of unrepresented
cases, and the district is providing the magistrate with resources
and support needed to carry out the job at a highly professional
level.14 4 On the other hand, differences in decisionmaking may
result from the specialized nature of the new magistrate judge's
assignment. In an analogous context, Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss
warns that specialist courts may suffer from "tunnel vision, with
judges who are overly sympathetic to the policies furthered by
the law that they administer. 14 5 In particular, the circumstances
of pro se litigants could cause a special adjudicator to stray from
general law as she creates new law highly tailored to the situa-
141. See, e.g., SMITH, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATES, supra note 131, at 175
("[M]agistrates [surveyed] who indicated that they gave particular attention to
each Social Security or prisoner case were in the minority.").
142. See id. at 53 (recognizing "concerns that magistrates might avoid
making controversial decisions in order to protect their jobs by gaining renewal
of their eight-year terms in office"); Smith, Assessing the Consequences, supra note
81, at 479 ("[T]here are potential incentives for magistrates to confine their
decision making within boundaries that are acceptable to the district judges.");
Note, Article II1 Constraints and the Expanding Civil Jurisdiction of Federal Magis-
trates: A Dissenting View, 88 YALE. L.J. 1023, 1056-57 (1979) (arguing that magis-
trates "may be encouraged to adopt a risk-averse strategy of adjudication by the
pressure ofjudicial scrutiny, a strategy eschewing unconventional decisions that
might otherwise be prompted by novel legal claims or pressing factual
idiosyncrasies").
143. SERON, NINE CASE STUDIES, supra note 69, at 89-90.
144. See supra notes 108-11 and accompanying text.
145. See Dreyfuss, supra note 125, at 3. For a discussion of the ethical
issues that this approach to the magistrate judge's position raises, see infra Part
III.C.
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tions that unrepresented and frequently indigent litigants face.
Whether Article III review will provide the critical generalist con-
text for the new magistrate judge's decisions is an open question
to be assessed in the light of experience.' 46
Perhaps more problematic is the suggestion that specializa-
tion will systematically disadvantage pro se litigants if repeat play-
ers-organizational defendants and government agencies-
enjoy strategic advantages not shared by one-shot litigants or are
able to capture the magistrate judge. 147 Drawing on Marc
Galanter's work, the argument is that recurrent litigation actors
are better positioned than individuals "to play for rules as well as
immediate gains," meaning (among other things), that they can
settle cases where the rule outcome is likely to be unfavorable in
the long run. 148 The individual pro se litigant, challenging, for
example, the legality of her boss's unwanted sexual advances, is
unlikely to trade an immediate damage award for a future
change in the rules. "Thus," Galanter predicts, "we would expect
the body of 'precedent'-i.e., cases capable of influencing future
outcomes-to be relatively skewed in favor of the recurrent
litigant."14 9
Establishing a specialist magistrate judge to handle particu-
lar categories of pro se claims could exacerbate these concerns
by creating a forum for a distinct set of government actors and
institutional defendants.1 5 0 Galanter emphasized, however, that
a court could use various procedural devices to overcome some
of the advantages that repeat players enjoy and so work to level
the playing field for one-shot litigants. 15  These approaches
include court-ordered aggregation and consolidation of claims
and also the assignment of claims to a non-profit or membership
association to represent the interests of individual claimants.1 5 2
At least one important judicial commentator has confirmed this
146. E.D.N.Y., Cry. R. 72.1-72.2.
147. See generally Marc Galanter, Delivering Legality: Some Proposals for the
Direction of Research, 11 LAw & Soc. 225, 231-35 (1976).
148. Id. at 232.
149. Id. at 233
150. Id. at 235 ("If we take an isolated individual with his claim or griev-
ance or ambition, it is indeed a rare instance in which the kinds of options that
are routine for large organizations will be feasible and effective."); see, e.g.,
SMITH, COURTS AND THE POOR, supra note 11, at 49 (reporting that although
small claims courts were intended to "create greater access to courts for poor
people who lack the resources to enter regular civil litigation .. . [a] high pro-
portion or plaintiffs in small claims courts are businesses that use the processes
to collect debt claims against individuals").
151. See Galanter, supra note 147, at 235-40.
152. Id.
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insight with practical experience. In justifying his decision to
consolidate prison petitions in the actions that eventually
became Ruiz v. Estelle, 5 ' Judge William Wayne Justice explained
that he ordered class certification and the participation of the
United States in order to boost the litigation capability of the
underresourced plaintiffs.
154
Other factors may also come into play. Institutional counsel,
such as the Office of the United States Attorney or the State
Attorney General, frequently represent defendants in pro se
cases. These offices have professional reputations to preserve, as
well as public values to protect, and both are likely to be under-
mined if counsel undertake repeated procedural maneuvers that
seek, among other things, to delay or avoid the hearing of a pro
se matter. Whether the Eastern District of New York's model
reinforces or mitigates the structural advantages of repeat organi-
zational players will depend, to some extent, on the magistrate
judge's case management approach to her docket and the reac-
tion it triggers in well-resourced parties to her authority.
B. Concerns about Efficiency
Yet another potential cost of the Eastern District of New
York's approach is that it may produce inefficiency, rather than
efficiency, ofjudicial effort.' 55 Although we do not have specific
information about the pro se docket, the literature in general
questions whether parties routinely challenge a magistrate's rec-
ommendation, thereby creating "wasteful duplication of deci-
sionmaking."' 56 Authors of somewhat older empirical studies
were surprised to find that appeals from a magistrate's recom-
153. 503 F. Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980), affd and vacated by 679 F.2d
1115 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 460 U.S. 1042 (1983).
154. Justice stated the following:
In most class action litigation.., the plaintiffs provide the impetus for
maintaining the proceeding as a class action. In contrast, the decision
in Ruiz to classify and consolidate the representative petitions that
became the basis on which the case was litigated was my own.
The prisoners had . . . no earthly idea of how to present their conten-
tions in a legally significant way. To allow them to present their griev-
ances in a halting and semi-literate fashion may have offered them
some formal right of participation, but that participation would have
been, and indeed, was, a nullity.
Justice, supra note 12, at 1, 10.
155. SUGGESTIONS FOR UTILIZATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGES, supra note 14,
at 2 (stating that "duplication ofjudicial work is inefficient. It wastes time and
increases costs and delay for litigants .... ").
156. Levin, Foreword, supra note 69, at ix.
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mendation are not routine: the Federal Judicial Center reported
in 1985 that "[p] erhaps the most interesting, and significant find-
ing to emerge ... is that attorneys do not challenge magistrates'
work on dispositive or nondispositive motions as a matter of
course."' 57 In reviewing a magistrate judge's report and recom-
mendation, the district court uses a de novo standard, but it exer-
cises this authority only if objections are filed, and only with
regard to that portion of the report to which the parties
object. 158 However, even without objections, inefficiency may
occur if the magistrate judge feels compelled to overjustify a rec-
ommendation or avoids dismissal of cases on the merits, relying,
instead, on procedural grounds. Moreover, the literature specifi-
cally questions whether a magistrate judge can review a habeas
corpus petition as effectively as an Article III judge. 159
Some commentators might contend that the Eastern District
of New York's approach will create perverse incentives for the
filing of frivolous claims and so increase the workload of the Arti-
cle III system overall. As the new magistrate judge's work gains
attention, pro se litigants will be arguably encouraged to file an
even greater number of claims with the court, thereby further
overloading the federal court's docket with frivolous lawsuits. As
one commentator has noted, in forma pauperis plaintiffs "have
little to lose by bringing numerous meritless actions. No eco-
nomic disincentives temper their enthusiasm for filing
complaints." 160
Variations on this argument appear frequently in the litera-
ture on equalization ofjudicial access. 61 Early discussions of fee-
waiver provisions in the state and federal courts emphasize the
important gatekeeping role that fees play in "discourag[ing] cap-
tious or frivolous litigation." '62 Moreover, in the fee context, at
157. SERON, NINE CASE STUDIES, supra note 69, at 108.
158. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1994).
159. See CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM REPORT, supra note 20, at 42-43 (noting
that the trial judge may be more familiar with a particular case than magistrate,
but urging that "trial judges should have the discretion to refer cases to magis-
trate judges in any case . . . where reference seems desirable").
160. Feldman,. supra note 41, at 428-29; see also Braden v. Estelle, 428
F.Supp. 595, 598 (S.D. Tex. 1977) ("[I]ndigents, unlike other litigants,
approach the courts in a context where they have nothing to lose and every-
thing to gain. The temptation to file complaints that contain facts which can-
not be proved is obviously stronger in such a situation.").
161. See, e.g., Rex E. Lee, The American Courts as Public Goods: Who Should
Pay the Costs of Litigation?, 34 CATH. U. L. REV. 267, 272-74 (1985) (questioning
whether subsidies should be extended to the indigent to afford or facilitate
judicial access).
162. Lee Silverstein, Waiver of Court Costs and Appointment of Counsel for
Poor Persons in Civil Cases, 2 VAL. U. L. REv. 21, 26 (1967).
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least, commentators assume that the litigant will be represented
by counsel, who can "be expected to discourage a nuisance
suit. "163 Precisely because the lawyer acts as a filter for frivolous
cases, the Aldisert Report twenty years ago urged that compen-
sated counsel be provided in § 1983 challenges to an inmate's
conditions of confinement.
164
Whether the Eastern District of New York's approach creates
these perverse incentives is an empirical question to be studied
over time. One needs to take into account the likely effect of the
Prison Litigation Reform Act on the prisoner pro se docket;'65
greater judicial attention to the termination of pro se matters
before issuance of the summons will also affect the new incentive
structure. Moreover, local rules provide that related cases are to
be assigned to the same judge and that "all pro se civil actions
filed by the same individual shall be deemed related."1 66 These
mandatory consolidation mechanisms, which also serve as a filter-
ing device, can be expected to produce some economies. Finally,
in reviewing pro se filings, the new magistrate judge will need to
identify litigants who repeatedly file frivolous actions and to take
appropriate action. 1 67
163. Id. at 27.
164. See ALDiSERT REPORT, supra note 28, at 14.
165. The Prison Litigation Reform Act requires prisoners, even if granted
in forma pauperis status, to pay the full $150 filing fee. Moreover, although
non-prisoners can still be granted waiver of the court's filing fees, the plaintiff
in an employment or Social Security case must first pursue administrative reme-
dies as a condition precedent to filing in court. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)
(1994) (employment); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1994) (Social Security). See generally
Marie Cordisco, Pre-PLRA Survey Reflects Courts' Experiences with Assessing Partial
Filing Fees in In Forma Pauperis Cases, 9 FJC DIRECTIONs 25 (1996).
166. E.D.N.Y. CrV. R. 50.3(e), Rules for the Division of Business Among
Judges.
167. The in forma pauperis statute deals specifically with prisoners
deemed too litigious with a "three strikes" rule. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (Supp.
IV 1999) ("In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal .. .under
this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated
.. brought an action or appeal ... that was dismissed on the grounds that it is
frivolous ...."). Treatment of noninmate plaintiffs is at the court's discretion.
See, e.g., Malley v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 112 F.3d 69 (2d Cir. 1997)
(affirming injunction prohibiting frequent litigant from filing suit in Southern
District of New York without permission); In re Martin-Trigona, 9 F.3d 226 (2d
Cir. 1993) (approving nondisclosure of identity ofjudge assigned to review pro
se plaintiffs applications for leave to file suit); In re Martin-Trigona, 737 F.2d
1254 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that issuance of injunction to halt repetitive filing
by a pro se plaintiff is appropriate where plaintiff "abuse[s] the process of the
Courts to harass and annoy others with meritless, frivolous, vexatious or repeti-
tive .. .proceedings") (quotation marks omitted)).
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We emphasize, however, that although many pro se actions
are frivolous,168 not all are. A recent empirical study of case dis-
positions in the Eastern District of California found that thirty-
one percent of prisoner cases survived summary judgment or
early dismissal as compared with forty-two percent of noninmate
cases.' 69 Meritorious actions may implicate important matters
such as denial of medical treatment in a prison facility or abusive
police practices.17 ° One might reply, however, that encouraging
an increase in any number of new claims, even if meritorious,
produces unnecessary costs byjudicializing grievances that might
otherwise lay dormant, inchoate, and out of court.'7 1 Failing to
judicialize these hurts, however, also has its costs in terms of lost
deterrent effects and dignitary concerns.' 72 The value of a claim,
in particular a constitutional claim that implicates a litigant's lib-
erty or potentially sets forth norms of conduct, should be quanti-
fied not only in dollars and cents, but also in terms of social
stability and bonds of solidarity.'73 Judge Weinstein explains,
"[T]he real consequence . . .can be measured, not in wasted
168. CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM REPORT, supra note 20, at 38 (stating that
"many [prisoner] cases lack merit"); see also SMITH, COURTS AND THE POOR, supra
note 11, at 39-40 ("[M]ore than 90 percent of prisoners' civil rights cases are
dismissed prior to any hearing by ajudge. The high rate of summary dismissals
is frequently attributed to the prevalence of frivolous complaints by
prisoners.").
169. See Mueller, supra note 20, at 1284-85.
170. See CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM REPORT, supra note 20, at 39 ("But the
remaining cases can be substantial .... For example, in a recent case involving
the California Medical Facility at Vacaville, the court ordered substantial
changes in medical, psychiatric and other health-care services.").
171. Marc Galanter thus questions the use of the term "legal needs,"
explaining that they are "not a primitive given, but an institutionally and ideo-
logically contingent selection from a vast pool of amorphous 'proto claims.'"
Galanter, supra note 148, at 227.
172. On deterrence effects, see Michelman, supra note 6, at 1168 n.46
(suggesting "the possibility that expansion of the ability of impoverished per-
sons to vindicate their legal rights would effect a saving in the social costs of
violations thereby deterred, a result which would to some extent offset any
increases in total outlays on litigation and related activities"). On dignitary
effects, see id. at 1173-75. ("Perhaps there is something generally demeaning,
humiliating, and infuriating about finding oneself in a dispute over legal rights
and wrongs and being unable to uphold one's own side of the case.").
173. See Phillip L. Spector, Financing the Courts through Fees: Incentives and
Equity in Civil Litigation, 58JuDICATURE 330, 331 (1975) ("While settling private
disputes, the courts are also establishing through precedent general rules of
conduct which order the myriad human relations in a complex society."); Rich-
man & Reynolds, supra note 69, at 296 (arguing against using "economic impact
[as] the only measure of the judicial system"); cf. Joseph Vining, Justice, Bureau-
cracy, and Legal Method, 80 MICH. L. REv. 248 (1981) ("To put it in economic
terms, justice is not a commodity, the production of which can be analyzed
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resources, but in meritorious claims discouraged and never
brought."'7 4 Nevertheless, the effect of the Eastern District of
New York's approach on patterns of litigation overall is an impor-
tant consideration, and suggests the need to study trends in pro
se filings as part of a general assessment of filing patterns across
the board.
Finally, in considering the efficacy the Eastern District of
New York's approach to pro se litigation, one should consider
the comparative advantages of alternative reforms. No doubt
some critics will urge the provision of counsel in all pro se cases
as a fairer and more efficient approach to the problem of unrep-
resented parties. 17 5 The government shows no sign of providing
sufficient funding for this purpose, and bar associations across
the country are likewise not able to fill the gap by mobilizing
their members to offer pro bono services to all litigants in
need.1 76 Indeed, as Russell Engler observes, "[e]ven staunch sup-
porters of an increase of lawyers for the poor have recognized
that 'there will necessarily be a permanent condition of scarcity
in the availability of lawyers."' 1 77
apart from its distribution. Who gets justice very much determines what it is
they are getting, whether, that is, it is justice.").
174. Weinstein, supra note 11, at 659.
175. See Feldman, supra note 41, at 437 ("Ideally, Congress should pro-
vide mandatory appointed counsel for any in forma pauperis plaintiff-whether
a prisoner or not-whose complaint is not frivolous.").
176. See William W. Schwarzer, Let's Try a Pro Se and Small-Stakes Civil Cal-
endar in the Federal Courts, 9 FJC DIRECTIONS 14, 16 (1996) ("The major obstacles
to success have been lack of interest among most of the bar and lawyers' well-
founded fear of malpractice claims brought by disgruntled litigants. Even
under the best of circumstances, volunteer legal assistance cannot be expected
to provide representation to more than a small fraction of pro se litigants.").
177. Russell Engler, Out of Sight and Out of Line: The Need for Regulation of
Lauyers' Negotiations with Unrepresented Poor Persons, 85 CALIF. L. REv. 79, 157
(1997) (quoting Gary Bellow & Jeanne Kettleson, From Ethics to Politics: Con-
fronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. REv. 337, 380
(1978)). Alan W. Houseman emphasizes:
Equal access to legal representation, important as it may be, will not
necessarily assure equal justice. Equal justice requires much more:
substantive laws that do not have a discriminatory effect on the poor, a
system of dispute resolution that assures at least minimum equality
between the parties, and an end to arbitrary governmental and private
actions.
Alan Houseman, Equal Protection and the Poor, 30 RurGERS L. REV. 887, 887-88
(1977). Even if counsel were provided, the quality of representation would
remain a significant concern. See, e.g., Elliott Andalman & David L. Chambers,
Effective Counsel for Persons Facing Civil Commitment: A Survey, A Polemic, and a
Proposal, 45 Miss. L. REv. 43, 44 (1974) ("[A]ttorneys appointed by courts for
nominal fees to represent allegedly ill persons rarely spend any effort on their
clients' behalf.").
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Nevertheless, one ought to consider the special magistrate
judge approach against the background of innovative programs
that other district courts have adopted to meet the pressures of
pro se cases. Data and analysis by the Federal Judicial Center on
this subject should prove very useful for comparative study.178 A
range of other options also deserves attention: the government
could fund class action litigation for pro se claims; the courts
could require mediation in categories of cases;' 79 and adminis-
trative agencies could be required to acquiesce to decisions of
the courts of appeal in prescribed situations.18 ° As the Eastern
District of New York collects information about the processing
and disposition of pro se cases, additional approaches, as well as
systemic solutions, may develop.18'
C. Concerns about Judicial Impartiality
One might object to the Eastern District of New York's
approach for ethical reasons: it implicates the magistrate judge
and pro se staff in functions that run counter to adversarial
assumptions. This argument rests on the idea that a judge best
preserves his or her impartiality by acting as a neutral umpire,
dependent on the parties to initiate and prosecute the action.
182
178. See generally Special Issue on Pro Se Litigation, supra note 8; see, e.g.,
Cordisco, supra note 25, at 18 (describing innovative efforts by the District of
Nevada to use "triage hearings" in pro se civil rights cases).
179. See Charles V. Craver, The Use of Non-Judicial Procedures To Resolve
Employment Discrimination Claim, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 141 (2001). But see
Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR A Critique of Fed-
eral Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 2169, 2176 (1993)
(arguing that court-annexed programs "will tend to systematically disadvantage
poorer and more risk-averse litigants, precisely the litigants the programs were
designed to help"); Schwarzer, supra note 177, at 16 ("ADR is rarely practical or
successful in cases brought by prisoners and other pro se litigants.").
180. Compare Samuel Estreicher & Richard Revesz, Nonacquiescence by Fed-
eral Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679 (1989), with Matthew Diller & Nancy
Morawetz, Intracircuit Non-acquiescence and the Breakdown of the Rule of Law; A
Response to Estreicher & Revesz, 99 YALE L.J. 801 (1990).
181. See JUD. CONF. OF THE U.S., LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL
COURTS 33 (1995) (calling for the collection and study of data regarding pro se
filings in the federal courts); see, e.g., Michael E. Penick &James G. Woodward,
Expanded Utilization of Federal Magistrate Judges: Lessons from the Eastern
District of Missouri (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Lois Bloom,
United States District Court, Eastern District of New York) (reporting on one
federal district court's case management approach to magistrate judges).
182. "Judges expect to play the traditional role of passive arbiter in the
litigation process, and operate on the assumption that attorneys representing
the parties will invoke the appropriate procedural rules and rules of evidence
on behalf of their clients in the pretrial and trial stages of litigation." GOLD-
SCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 9, at 3. Commentators tend to discuss the adversary
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"Americans tend to assume," one federal judge explains, "that an
impartial judge must be a passive judge, to whom the case is
brought and before whom the case is constructed by the par-
ties." 18 3 Impartiality as passivity prevents the judge from "prema-
turely committing himself to one version of the facts," and also
serves "to convince society that the judicial system is
trustworthy.""84
The conventional view assumes that the parties possess ade-
quate resources to present and defend their positions. Indigent
pro se litigants, however, suffer significant structural disadvan-
tage when they appear before the court, lacking the equipage
needed for an effective presentation.185 Mirjan R. Damaska, for
example, emphasizes the fact that "there is relatively little an
untutored person can extrapolate from his or her ordinary life
experience that can be used in forensic proof-taking without
system in heroic terms. See, e.g., Frank A.. Kaufman, The Right of Self-Representa-
tion and the Power of Jury Nullification, 28 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 269, 270 (1978)
("Those of us who believe that the common law has produced the finest
(though far from perfect) system ofjustice which man has yet devised are com-
mitted to the adversarial rather than the inquisitorial approach.").
183. Justice, supra note 12, at 7; see also, Stephan Landsman, A Brief Survey
of the Development of the Adversary System, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 713, 714 (1983) ("The
central precept of adversary process is that out of the sharp clash of proofs
presented by adversaries in a highly structured forensic setting is most likely to
come the information from which a neutral and passive decision maker can
resolve a litigated dispute. .. ").
184. Landsman, supra note 184, at 714; seeJack B. Weinstein, EthicalDilem-
mas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 469, 538 (1994) ("The ABA's
Model Code ofJudicial Conduct and the federal statute governing the conduct
of federal judges mandate impartiality."). Adversarial assumptions form the
basis of ethical codes that govern judicial conduct. See George D. Marlow, From
Black Robes to White Lab Coats: The Ethical Implications of a Judge's Sua Sponte, Ex
Parte Acquisition of Social and Other Scientific Evidence During the Decision-Making
Process, 72 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 291, 323 (1998) ("[I]n the codes of judicial con-
duct of many states, the rules or commentaries provide that judges may not
independently investigate facts in a case and must consider only the evidence
presented at trial.").
185. See, e.g., Hiram E. Chodosh et al., Indian Civil Justice System Reform:
Limitation and Preservation of the Adversarial Process, 30 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1,
28-29 (1997-1998) ("[T]he adversarial model appears poorly designed to meet
the needs of a ... population with widespread poverty, illiteracy, and unfamili-
arity with formal legal procedure."). P. N. Bhagwati writes:
Where one of the parties to a litigation is weak and helpless and does
not possess adequate social and material resources, he is bound to be
at a disadvantage under the adversarial system, not only because of the
difficulty in getting competent legal representation, but more than
anything else because of the inability to produce relevant evidence
before the Court.
Judicial Activism and Public Interest Litigation, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 561,
573 (1985).
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much lawyerly intermediation." '186 Similarly, a recent empirical
study of pro se prisoner petitions in the Eastern District of Cali-
fornia reports that the absence of counsel is "one of the most
difficult aspects" of these cases because the plaintiffs "often file
complaints that are difficult to decipher... ; often make proce-
dural errors, engage in inappropriate ex parte correspondence
with the court, or require clarification of the court's orders.
' 87
The pro se litigant thus places the conscientious judge on the
horns of a dilemma: the court can ignore the claimant's obvious
position of disadvantage, adhering as a formal matter to ethical
norms;' 8 8 or the court can intervene in ways that attempt to
ensure a fair and accurate result but deviate from the norm of
passivity. 1' As Russell Engler observes, "Despite the vast number
of unrepresented litigants, and the significant impact on the
courts in which the unrepresented litigant is the norm, the roles
of the players remain largely those developed for an idealized
world in which all litigants are represented by lawyers."190
Commentators recognize, however, that the formal ideal of
adversarial justice does not accurately describe the U.S. court sys-
tem as it operates in practice. Not only do they question the
186. MIRJAN R. DAMASKA, EVIDENCE LAW ADPJr 11-12 (1997).
187. Mueller, supra note 20, at 1280 (quoting ALDISERT REPORT, supra
note 28, at 21) (quotation marks omitted).
188. See, e.g., Canon 3B(7) of the 1990 CODE OFJUDICLL ETHICS (stating
in the Commentary that "a judge must not independently investigate facts in a
case and must consider only the evidence presented"), quoted in Marlow, supra
note 185, at 292 (1998); see also Weinstein, supra note 185, at 539 ("A rigid
conception of the judge as presiding passively and neutrally over an adversarial
proceeding in which the litigants bear the whole burden of presentation is
sometimes inaccurate and unwise.").
189. As stated by Goldschmidt et al.:
The judge who provides any form of assistance to a self-represented
litigant whose adversary is represented risks being accused of unfair-
ness by the opposing attorney. Yet, by maintaining complete passivity
when a self-represented litigant makes errors jeopardizing the claim or
defense sought to be made, some would argue that the judge runs
afoul of the meaningful hearing requirement of the due process
clause and the rights of access to the court, self-representation, and an
open court.
GOLDSCHMIDT ET AL., supra note 9, at 25; see also Engler, supra note 178, at
1987-88 ("Some lawyers and judges even express concern that unrepresented
litigants are using their status to gain an unfair advantage over represented par-
ties, who are trying to play by the rules.").
190. Engler, supra note 178, at 1988; see also Duniway, supra note 15, at
1285-86 (observing that an indigent litigant with a meritorious claim "needs
legal advice before he ever gets to court; he needs to have his case investigated
and prepared. These are not things that the courts can or should be expected
to do for him.").
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bright line distinction between adversarial and inquisitorial jus-
tice, 1 ' but they also emphasize the "many nonadversarial ele-
ments [that] have become important parts of the American
adjudicatory system."' 92 Managerial judging is now a conven-
tional aspect of the U.S. judicial function 9 ' and involves the
court in many activities that do not fit the adversarial model.'94
Some state judicial systems have adopted rules and regulations to
govern pro se matters in specialist courts that require the presid-
ing judge to depart from the passive umpire's role.195 And
judges presiding over mass tort cases have been said to "have
sneaked away from the traditional U.S. adversarial model of jus-
tice, . . . not by design, but by necessity and ad hoc innova-
tion."196 As one state court judge explains: "the heavy
responsibility of ensuring a fair trial in... [a pro se matter] rests
directly on the trial judge .... [T] he judge finds that he must
explain matters that would normally not require explanation and
must point out rules and procedures that would normally not
191. Although the terms "passive" and "active" recur in the literature,
many proceduralists question the stark division these categories suggest. See,
e.g., J.A. Jolowicz, The Active Role of the Court in Civil Litigation, in PUBLIC INTEREST
PARTIES AND THE AcTIVE ROLE OF THE JUDGE IN CrvIL LITIGATION 157, 157-68
(Mauro Cappelletti &J. A. Jolowicz eds., 1975) ("Neither the 'absolutely active'
nor the 'absolutely passive' judge is even theoretically possible, and every legal
system is bound to strike a balance between the two extremes.... ."). Id. at 157;
Sean Doran et al., Rethinking Adversariness in Nonjury Criminal Trials, 23 AM. J.
ClM L. 1, 13 (1995) (noting "considerable confusion" in the distinction
between adversarial and inquisitorial legal systems); Edward F. Sherman, The
Evolution of American Civil Trial Process Towards Greater Congruence with Continental
Trial Practice, 7 TUL.J. INT'L & COMP. L. 125, 125 (1999) ("The distinctiveness of
the American 'common law' trial process in civil cases from that of European
continental 'civil law' countries is a generally accepted, but too infrequently
questioned, truism.").
192. Ellen E. Sward, Values, Ideology, and the Evolution of the Adversary Sys-
tem, 64 IND. L.J. 301, 301-02 (1989).
193. See SERON, NINE CASE STUDIES, supra note 69, at 15 (stating in 1985
that "[i]ncreasingly, judges are being called upon to remove their 'umpire's'
hat and take more active and direct control over their cases-to monitor and to
manage their cases") (internal citation omitted)).
194. See generally Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 374
(1982) (describing and criticizing this trend).
195. See, e.g., FL. SM. CL. R. RULE 7.140 (providing that the court shall
assist unrepresented parties with "order of presentation of material evidence);
MASS. R. SM. CL. RULE 7(c) (requiring court to "conduct the trial... as it deems
best suited to discover the facts and do justice in the case").
196. Howard M. Erichson, Mass Tort Litigation and Inquisitorial Justice, 87
CEO. L.J. 1983, 1985 (1999). But see Adam J. Siegel, Note, Setting Limits on Judi-
cial Scientific, Technical, and Other Specialized Fact-Finding in the New Millennium, 86
CORNELL L. REV. 167, 198-212 (2000) (criticizing this trend).
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require pointing out."'97 Federal administrative law judges simi-
larly have a regulatory duty to assist unrepresented litigants that
includes a "basic obligation to develop a full and fair record."' 98
In a number of contexts, courts and commentators are thus
coming to recognize the authority, if not the responsibility, of a
judge to depart from the ethical norms of adversarial justice in
order to ensure a fair and accurate result and, in particular, to
take an activist stance in cases involving unrepresented liti-
gants.' 99 To the extent that specialized courts are themselves a
deviation from adversarial norms,200 they create a different con-
text within which to assess the judge's ethical obligations. At the
same time, however, commentators caution against the wholesale
removal of adversarial constraints on the judicial role, urging
the development of alternative guidelines for appropriate
behavior.2 '
The Eastern District of New York has recognized the special
circumstances that particular stages of litigation present for pro
se litigants. For example, summary judgment motions are often
filed in employment discrimination cases when the defendant-
employer has proffered a legitimate non-discriminatory reason
197. Oko v. Rogers, 466 N.E.2d 658, 661 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
198. Lashley v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 708 F.2d 1048, 1051 (6th
Cir. 1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts refer to the "dual hats"
of adjudicator and investigator that the administrative law judge wears, but
emphasize that the ALJ is not an advocate. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S.
389, 410 (1971) ("Neither are we persuaded by the advocatejudge-multiple-hat
suggestion. It assumes too much and would bring down too many procedures
designed, and working well, for a governmental structure of great and growing
complexity."); Pastrana v. Chater, 917 F. Supp. 103 (D.P.R. 1996) (reversing
decision of biased administrative lawjudge);Jeffrey S. Wolfe & Lisa B. Proszek,
Interaction Dynamics in Federal Administrative Decision Making: The Role of the Inquis-
itorialJudge and the Adversarial Lawyer, 33 TULSA LJ. 293, 297-98 (1997) ("Unlike
her adversarial counterpart, the Administrative Law Judge is ... active, with a
scope of inquiry fundamentally co-extensive with that of the individual whose
claim now appears before her.").
199. See Schwarzer, supra note 177, at 16 (describing an activist role for
federal judges in pro se cases). Indeed, one Article III judge justifies an
interventionist approach to pro se prison litigation as a way to preserve tradi-
tional adjudicative forms: "If I was an activist judge in the initial phases of the
case, that activism really came from a straightforward commitment to the tradi-
tional goals of adjudication, in a situation in which the necessary balance of
forces that underlies the traditional concept of adjudication did not exist." Jus-
tice, supra note 12, at 9.
200. See Sward, supra note 193, at 338 ("Special courts might.., be seen
as a non-adversarial development in adjudication. Judges in specialized courts
acquire expertise that may-indeed, is intended to-influence their decisions to
some extent.").
201. See Weinstein, supra note 185, at 568 (acknowledging that adversarial
norms "provide powerful boundaries to both discretion and abuse").
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for taking the adverse employment action, and the plaintiff-
employee cannot rebut the employer's "good faith" justification
to prove discrimination in the hiring or firing decision.2 °2 By
local rule, the district requires the party seeking summary judg-
ment to give separate notice to a pro se plaintiff of the require-
ments for opposing such a motion and setting forth the
consequences for failing to respond.20 3 The new magistrate
judge has likewise customized discovery procedures to meet the
needs of her pro se employment discrimination docket by man-
dating the exchange of basic information, such as plaintiff's full
personnel file, in lieu of the discovery plan contemplated by Rule
26(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, recognizing,
among other things, that requiring the presence of a pro se liti-
gant at a conference to plan discovery may not be an efficient use
of court time. Undoubtedly, other circumstances will arise on
the magistrate judge's pro se docket that will require her to
depart from adversarial assumptions and strike a balance among
the requirements of fairness, impartiality, and efficiency.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have explored innovative efforts by one
federal district to deal with the rise in pro se civil filings and the
consequent pressures that these cases create for the courts.
Whether the Eastern District of New York's approach improves
access to justice must be revisited as the district acquires experi-
ence with the work of its new magistrate judge and its reorga-
nized pro se office. In the meanwhile, lawyers can assist the
courts in affording greater judicial access by providing pro bono
services to those in need. They can also take a collective stance,
by persuading bar associations to mandate community service
requirements and lobbying the government for increased legal
services funding.20 4 Lawyers also share in a structural obligation,
202. At least one commentator urges that "litigants are entitled to at least
be warned that when confronted with a motion for summary judgment they
must obtain counter-affidavits or other evidentiary material to avoid the entry of
judgment against them. Biro, supra note 65 (citing Roseboro v. Garrison, 528
F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975)). However, "courts do not have a duty to inform a pro
se litigant of the need to respond to a motion for summary judgment." Id.
203. S.D.N.Y. Civ. R. 56.2; E.D.N.Y. Civ. R. 56.2.
204. David Luban writes:
The obligation to perform pro bono service and the obligation to
engage in law reform activities ... are familiar and important parts of
the American landscape of American legal ethics .... It is not entirely
right to describe these as uncontroversial parts of legal ethics, because
the bar as a long history of resisting proposals for mandatory pro bono
service, and the Supreme Court has upheld the First Amendment
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to evaluate existing institutions to ensure that the basic court
structure meets the demands of justice as those demands evolve
and change. As Liam B. Murphy explains: "IT]he responsibility
that people have in respect of justice must be to support and
bring about just institutions . . . . Since institutions are not
agents and don't actually have any responsibilities at all, it is only
people who can ensure that institutions satisfy principles of
justice."20 5
The Eastern District of New York's approach to pro se litiga-
tion is no doubt imperfect, 20 6 raising vexing questions about the
future role of the Article III courts and the appropriate use of
federal judicial power. But given nonideal conditions and imper-
fect alternatives, the use of a special magistrate judge to oversee
the pro se docket warrants further consideration as an experi-
ment in institutional adaptation. Even with the problems of spe-
cialization, the assignment of pro se cases to a single magistrate
judge may provide greater attention to the problems of pro se
litigants and so increase the possibility of developing systemic
solutions. We hope that this Article generates further discussion
about the needs of pro se litigants and of the ways that the fed-
eral courts might evolve to move us closer to the ideal of equal
justice for all.
right of protesting lawyers to a rebate of that portion of their
mandatory bar dues used on law reform activities with which they
disagree."
David Luban, The Social Responsibilities of Lawyers: A Green Perspective, 63 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 955, 955-56 (1995).
205. Liam B. Murphy, Institutions and the Demands of Justice, 27 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF., 251, 271 (1999).
206. See generally, JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYrH AND REALITY IN
AMERICAN JUSTICE (1949). Frank writes:
I see defects that I believe can be eradicated, but that will never be
intelligently dealt with unless they are publicized. On the other hand,
I have no fatuous notion that the judicial process can be made perfect.
It is a human process, involving inherent human failings and weak-
nesses. Yet its substantial betterment is nevertheless possible. Indeed,
to better it, requires recognition of its unavoidably human, fallible,
character.
Id. at 2.

